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ABSTRACT

Road violence is now commonplace in North American cities. However, it has not
always been like this. During the advent of the automobile, every road death was a
source of outrage. It was concerted action from the motor industry, organized into
the self-named “motordom,” that managed to shift the blame of the deaths. With
the new perception that cars had the right to the roads, victims of road violence
would start sharing that blame with drivers in the popular opinion. This shift
affected law, including tort law. Before the advent of the motor vehicle, cycling
law was an area of legal studies, called the “law of wheelmen.” It was put aside
after the automobile, with the creation of road traffic laws clearly centred on
motorized vehicles. Common law courts, facing tort claims arising from road
violence, remained loyal to the negligence principle. This thesis explores
alternatives to the classical car-centred understanding of tort law in Ontario. With
an advocacy-oriented approach, it focuses on collisions involving bicycles and
motor vehicles, with the intent of providing solutions that result in better
distribution of the burden caused by automobiles on road safety. A comparative
lens was used in order to find and analyze better options in other jurisdictions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Bicycling as means of transportation is a live political discussion in Canada and
throughout the world. Academics in many different areas of knowledge, such as
sociology, geography, and history, have produced significant research on the topic. 1
However, not a great deal of academic legal literature and research has been produced. 2
Proposing an agenda to fill this gap, Christopher Waters suggests the rebirth of
cycling law.3 This area of law existed before the automobile era under the name “law of
wheelmen;” however, it was forgotten after the motorization of our roads and laws.
Waters cites many areas that may be the focus of future legal cycling research, from
infrastructure to enforcement. Cycling law, as any area of law, cannot be disconnected
from other areas of social research. For that reason, Waters relies not only on legal
literature from the law of wheelmen era, but also on modern academic literature on
cycling, citing for example Glen Norcliffe as the leading scholar on the topic.
1

See for example James Lewis Longhurst, Bike Battles: a History of Sharing the American Road (Seattle:
University of Washington, 2015); Elly Blue, Bikenomics: How Bicycling Can Save the Economy, 2nd ed
(Portland: Microcosm, 2016); Glen Norcliffe, The Ride to Modernity: The Bicycle in Canada, 1869-1900
(Toronto: University of Toronto press, 2001); Wiebe E Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a
Theory of Sociotechnical Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Zachary Mooradian Furness, One Less Car:
Bicycling and the Politics of Automobility (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2010); Yuriê Baptista
César, A Garantia do Direito à Cidade através do Incentivo ao Uso da Bicicleta nos Deslocamentos Urbanos
[The Guarantee of the Right to the City through the Incentive to the Use of the Bicycle in Urban Mobility]
(BA in Geography Monograph, Universidade de Brasília, 2010) [unpublished, archived at Universidade de
Brasília].
2
Some of the few examples include Christopher Waters, “The Rebirth of Bicycling Law?” (2012) 91:2 Can
Bar Rev 395; Gabrielle Appleby & Adam Webster, “Cycling and the Law” (2016) 39:1 UNSWLJ 129; Colleen
Maker, “Strict Liability in Cycling Laws to Ready the Roads for Environmentally Friendly Commuting”
(2015) 42 Boston College Envtl Aff L Rev 473; Piero Barbacovi, Bicicleta e Direito à Cidade: Como as
Políticas Públicas em Ciclomobilidade Afetam o Direito à Cidade dos Cidadãos de Fortaleza [Bicycle and
Right to the City: How the Public Policies in Cycle Mobility Affect the Right to the City of the Citizens of
Fortaleza] (LLB Monograph, Universidade Federal do Ceará, 2016) [unpublished, archived at Universidade
Federal do Ceará].
3
Waters, supra note 2.

1

This thesis accepts the proposed rebirth of cycling law and intends to contribute to
its comprehension, with a special focus on the protection of road violence victims
through the lenses of tort law. It is an important contention of this research that
understanding the assumptions that form the basis of legal decisions on cycling requires
researching the historical construction of how our society perceives cars, bicycles,
pedestrians, and the streets. Although this perception can affect many areas of legal
decisions in many geographical locations throughout North America, a focus on liability
law in Ontario was chosen in order to limit the scope of the thesis.
Before we start, it is important to note that this research focuses on a North
American context in order to understand the law and policy in Ontario. It assumes that
the cycling processes in American and Canadian cities are similar, as are urban dynamics
in general. Some references are made to European countries, considering the
interconnections that happen in the Global North, and some lessons are also taken from
the Global South, especially Brazil, where the author has most experience in cycling
advocacy.
Naturally, this thesis is written under a cycling advocacy perspective. It assumes
that cycling contributes to face several modern urban problems, such as pollution, 4

4

Maker, supra note 2.

2

obesity,5 traffic congestion,6 and, as will be seen in this thesis, road violence. The term
“accident” is not used, since it makes road violence seem unavoidable.7
This thesis is composed of five chapters. After this introduction, historical
research will take place in the second chapter to investigate the dynamics that moulded
how we currently perceive cars, bicycles, and the streets. This chapter, composed of three
sections, is important to inform the second chapter, which will explore how legal
decisions and statutes in Ontario deal with cycling when it comes to liability claims – and
what could and should be changed. In the first section, a brief history of the advent of the
bicycle will be shown, with all the urban changes that accompanied it. The focus of this
section is to assess how bicycles paved the way for the automobiles. Similarly, the first
section will lay the groundwork for the second section, which focuses on the advent of
the automobile and on how the perception of its danger has changed with time. The third
section will show the return of the bicycle as an important topic when it comes to
mobility.
Turning to the third chapter, its first section will provide an overview of the
historical construction of cycling law. Then the second section will investigate Canadian
case law and assess how the social constructions of the bicycle, the car, and the streets
found in the first chapter influences legal decisions.

5

Li Ming Wen & Chris Rissel, “Inverse Associations between Cycling to Work, Public Transport, and
Overweight and Obesity: Findings from a Population Based Study in Australia” (2008) 46:1 Preventive
Medicine 29.
6
David Ogilvie et al, “Promoting Walking and Cycling as an Alternative to Using Cars: Systematic Review”
(2004) 329:7469 BMJ 763.
7
Julyver Modesto de Araujo, “O Acidente de Trânsito é Necessário ou Contingente?” [Is the Traffic
Accident Necessary or Contingent?] (2009), online: Conteudo Juridico
<http://www.conteudojuridico.com.br/artigo,o-acidente-de-transito-e-necessario-oucontingente,25236.html>.

3

As the last chapter before the conclusion, the fourth chapter will be an attempt to
fill legal gaps identified in the second chapter. For that purpose, the French and German
tort and insurance systems will be analyzed. The Ontario no-fault insurance scheme will
also be studied, in order to assess the possibility of broadening its scope. Lastly, the
Quebec no-fault insurance scheme will be analyzed as another possible alternative.
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CHAPTER 2
WHO SOCIALLY BELONGS TO THE ROAD?

The modern history of our streets is a history of defining and redefining social
perceptions of the streets and the machines that are operated on them. Traffic conflicts on
public roads increased dramatically with the advent of the automobile. When motor
vehicles first appeared, motorists had to struggle to become accepted on the streets.
Before the automobile, however, a similar struggle happened with bicycles. Cyclists were
a new category of road users and it took them some time to be accepted as such. After the
automobile, this struggle remains alive, but now very differently from how it was before
the motorized vehicle dominated the streets.
In this chapter, the history of the advent of both the bicycle and the automobile
will inform how social perception towards both machines changed through time. The
bicycle, as will be seen, struggled to be accepted on two separate occasions: when it first
came into existence on our roads and when it was forgotten in favour of the motorized
vehicle.

The bicycle
Automobiles are now associated with freedom. However, the first product
considered to be a “freedom machine” was the bicycle. 8 Its introduction to the urban
roads allowed people to move easily, faster, and with larger spatial freedom combined

8

Glen Norcliffe, Critical Geographies of Cycling: History, Political Economy and Culture (Farnham: Ashgate,
2015) at 2.

5

with the ability to decide their own individual schedules for the first time.9 As one could
expect, with this freedom of breaking existing boundaries came many cultural changes.
Although the cycling struggles are currently related to the automobile culture – by far the
biggest barrier to everything related to cycling – the bicycle’s advent did not come so
smoothly even prior to the automobile’s existence.
In this section, the advent of the bicycle will be discussed. It will be shown that
bicycles introduced many of the social elements that we see today in our cities, most of
which were transferred to automobiles. For example, bicycles made it possible for people
to live further from their workplaces. 10 It was the highwheel bicycle that encouraged
males to use a moving vehicle to show their status and masculinity, which is done today
with automobiles.11 The car, of course, allowed for an exaggeration of these elements,
causing severe problems as will be discussed throughout this thesis. As will be shown in
this section, however, bicycles played an important role to pave the way for automobiles
– both physically and culturally.
From “macho bicycles” to safety bicycles
Elements of gender were present in the bicycle culture since its advent. When it
became popular, its most common type was the highwheel bicycle, characterized by a
higher front tire. Due to its height and difficult maneuverability, its users would often fall

9

Ibid at 148.
Ibid at 13.
11
Thiago Benicchio, "Sociedade do Automóvel" (2005), online (video): YouTube
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4eWvSwzkidE>.
10

6

and hurt themselves. Men liked to use it to display their courage and ability. 12 Women
would generally not use it.
Two social groups can be distinguished in relation to this new artifact. The first,
consisting of athletic young men, considered it a “macho bicycle”.13 The second consisted
of older people and women, who considered it an unsafe vehicle. 14 The way in which
bicycles were perceived was exemplified in the culture of cycling clubs at that time. A
regular cycling club was exclusively male, had substantial barriers to entry, and was
“very cavalier in its attitudes to risk and safety.”15 Women came to use the bicycle in
large numbers when the modern safety bicycle appeared. As an indicator of the new
cycling era, the Montreal Bicycle Club had its first female member in April 1888: Alice
A. Simpson, who was the daughter of a club member.16 A woman in the club, however,
was not well perceived by all members. Conservative members wanted to preserve the
status that the highwheel bicycle conferred on them. Nonetheless, more and more people
were attracted to safety bicycles, making those conservative members seem
anachronistic17 – especially after 1892, when more comfortable pneumatic tires became
widespread. By that time, one-third of all cyclists in North America were female.18
Cycling clubs originating in the era of the highwheel bicycle formed a new mode
of technological citizenship, characterized by male predominance and social elements
deemed as male highlighted by its use, including the courage to face danger. Decades

12

Norcliffe, supra note 8 at 35.
Ibid.
14
Bijker, supra note 1 at 40.
15
Norcliffe, supra note 8 at 138.
16
Ibid at 137.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid at 158.
13

7

later, these characteristics would be transferred to the automobile, 19 used by males to
demonstrate their manhood thought risky behaviour.
From the elite to the masses
Bicycles were not popular in the beginning, in the sense that they were not used
by the masses. Until the late 1890s, they were not affordable to regular workers due to
their high price.20 At that time, the bicycle was one of the most visible indicators of status
and of technological progress,21 being used by the richest to show off their wealth.
Again, cycling clubs were an example of the bicycle’s role to show status. High
standards of entry made it impossible for people outside the elite to join the clubs. In the
Montreal Cycling Club, considering a new potential member depended on their referral
by one current member and second by another. A membership committee voted
anonymously, and a single vote against the potential new member would prohibit their
entry.22
The “gentlemen” characteristics of the club members were transferred to their
behaviour in cycling on the roads. Club members were expected to behave safely and
respectfully, especially towards women. In Britain, for example, the Cycle Touring
Union prohibited cycle racing on public roads, believing that those races damaged the
image of road cycling.23

19

Ibid at 138.
Ibid at 4; Longhurst, supra note 1 at 24.
21
Norcliffe, supra note 8 at 217.
22
Ibid at 141.
23
Ibid at 5.
20

8

Cycling club members, however, were not the only bicycle users on the roads.
Beside the club members who cycled in an orderly fashion on them, streets also had
cyclists who would show their status by riding fast and recklessly, which was considered
a masculine performance referred to as “scorching.” 24 As a result of the connection
between scorching and maleness, the attitude was far more condemned when the rider
was a woman.25
When its cost was reduced, the bicycle became commonplace. It then lost its
general function of determining the owner’s status and started to be used for the
convenience it provided. 26 Years later, cars would allow the richest to display and
perform their status on the streets again. Curiously, the same process that happened with
bicycles also happened with cars, which began as an object that showed status and later
became a popular vehicle. Today, the use of cars to assert status is still present, and in
some cycling groups expensive bicycles are also still being used in this way.
Suburbanization
The bicycle pushed many behavioural and spatial changes on cities. One of these
changes was their physical size. With bicycles, citizens could now work, study, and live
further away. Along with streetcars and railways, bicycles were partially responsible for
the suburbanization of the population.27 Following the bicycle, cars also strengthened the
process of suburbanization, resulting in spread-out cities suffering from all the
consequences of low density and mass car ownership that are seen today.
24

Ibid at 159.
Ellen Gruber Garvey, “Reframing the Bicycle: Advertising-Supported Magazines and Scorching Women”
(1995) 47:1 American Quarterly 66 at 75.
26
Norcliffe, supra note 8 at 12.
27
Ibid at 13.
25

9

The cult of speed
Before the advent of the bicycle, roads were mainly dominated by horses and
horse drawn carriages. People on bicycles shared the road with them, with constant
conflicts. The users of these established modes of transportation did not enjoy having to
share their space with the newcomer bicycle.28
Criticism of bicycles came from many directions. Editors and even evangelists
would angrily argue against them. 29 The growing number of cyclists moving around
without respect for pedestrians would help shape the image of the vehicle as something
that caused disorder.30 With bicycles came the cult of speed,31 causing a speed limit of
eight miles per hour on city roads to be proposed in Winnipeg.32 Some locations got to
the point of totally banning bicycles from the roads, such as the city of San Francisco and
the entire state of Kentucky in the 1880s.33 Bicycles were forbidden in many parks, as in
Brooklyn’s Prospect Park, Philadelphia’s Fairmont Park, and Chicago’s Lincoln Park.34
Critics of the cult of speed claimed that riding at high speed into the wind would cause a
permanent disfigurement called “bicycle face.”35
Due to the increasing number of cyclists, bicycles survived both the several
prohibitions and the regular struggles with horse-drawn vehicles that took place in the
1870s and 1880s. Their legal legitimacy on the roads came with the leading common-law

28

Ibid at 146.
Ibid at 163.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Waters, supra note 2.
33
Longhurst, supra note 1 at 32.
34
Ibid.
35
Carl Honore, In Praise of Slow: How a Worldwide Movement Is Challenging the Cult of Speed (Toronto:
Knopf Canada, 2004) at 46.
29
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decision in Taylor v Goodwin, in which bicycles were declared to be carriages and were
therefore allowed on the roads and forbidden on the sidewalks.36 As will be seen in the
following chapter, cars also struggled to become accepted on the roads and eventually
won, although through a very different process.
The cycling industry
Another way through which the cycling culture was continued in the automobile
culture was the development of the industry of mass production. Many bicycle
manufacturers became, at a later stage, producers of automobiles.37
An example of this movement can be seen in the Pope Manufacturing Company.
Through manufacturing bicycles, Albert Augustus Pope developed methods of testing
and quality control considered to be essential for the automobile industry.38 Henry Ford,
who later became a mass producer of cars and an icon of mass production due to the
methods he created, visited Pope’s industries many times and even worked as a bicycle
mechanic for a competitor of Pope’s company, learning substantially about bicycle
production before producing automobiles. 39 It is argued that Pope’s fabrication and
assembly facility served as the prototype of the Fordist plant. 40
Pope not only developed the mass production of bicycles, he also acted politically
to benefit his products. He advocated for cycling on city roads and in city parks, such as

36

Taylor v Goodwin, [1879] 4 QBD 228.
Norcliffe, supra note 8 at 2.
38
David Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of
Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press) at 207.
39
Norcliffe, supra note 8 at 86.
40
Ibid at 87.
37
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in New York’s Central Park, where cycling was prohibited in 1880. 41 In 1881, a cyclist
deliberately rode in the park to judicially challenge the prohibition. Pope spent thousands
of dollars in litigation for this case. Cycling in Central Park would only be allowed in
1887 by an act of the New York State. Years later, the automobile industry would
advocate for driving cars on roads. Differently from Pope’s effort, however, the industry
would act concertedly, lobbying as a block to politically and socially promote its product.
The cycling industry was extremely important to the development of the
automobile industry. Even though the automobile obfuscated the bicycle, resulting in the
latter’s decline, many companies embarked in the new era, stopping the production of
bicycles in favour of producing cars.
The good roads movement
Cycling advocacy had great achievements at the early stage of urban cycling.
Beside the political actions of Pope, there were also cyclists’ associations advocating for
better conditions for cycling. Although cycle paths were an option, as installed in
Winnipeg,42 cyclists would mainly ride on the road and advocate for road improvements.
Cyclists were ahead of the good roads movement, and their pressure for better
roads resulted in the first smooth roads in the Americas.43 What they didn’t expect was
that the good roads, the industrial practices developed in the bicycling factories, and the
cult of speed would pave the way for the dominance of a machine that took over the
bicycle’s image as a symbol of modernity. With an industry that holds much more

41

Ibid at 79–80.
Waters, supra note 2.
43
Ibid.
42
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economic and political power, the automobile would overshadow the bicycle for many
decades.

The automobile
There are 1.25 million road deaths annually in the world, 44 2,114 of them in
Canada.45 Cars have caused violence and deaths on the road since their advent. Cycling
advocates usually wonder how it is possible that drivers do not perceive the danger of
driving. How can someone, driving a machine that may quickly kill a human being, not
focus all their attention on this activity? How can some find it inoffensive to peek at the
cell phone while driving? In this chapter, changes in the social perception of the car will
be studied, showing how, in the beginning of the automobile era, its danger was clear in
the eyes of everyone.
The car has become part of many cultures all over the world, mainly in North
America. It is a regular tool for Canadians to get to work or school. People have become
so used to it that the activity is automatic and rarely thought about anymore. However,
this does not seem to fully explain the process by which Canadians lost the perception
that the automobile is dangerous. The naturalization of the danger of the automobile was
a historic process. To understand it, one must acknowledge what has happened since the

44

World Health Organization, Global Status Report on Road Safety 2015: supporting a decade of action
(Geneva: WHO, 2015) at 2.
45
Ibid at 106.
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automobiles first appeared on the streets. The main change in the social perception of
danger on the streets happened between the 1900s and the 1930s.46
Social groups fight for their interpretation of the streets
James Lewis Longhurst claims that the cultural background that results in specific
types of policies are either described as values or as frames.47 Different from values –
derived from philosophies of diverse groups – frames are based on rhetoric and
assumptions that shape people’s perceptions. For Longhurst, policy and perception
influence each other.48
Frames are an important concept for Peter Norton. The historian explains the
construction of street policies through the idea that different social groups had different
frames shaping their perception of the streets. Norton claims that streets were “socially
reconstructed as places where motorists unquestionably belonged.”

49

That social

reconstruction explains the physical reconstruction of the streets, redesigned for cars.
Norton argues that between 1915 and 1930, a “violent revolution” took place, changing
the perception of cars – previously seen as an intruder.50
Apart from the struggles that the bicycle faced to be accepted in the streets, the
social constructions of the streets were mostly stable before the advent of the automobile.
Although the advent of the bicycle resulted complaints about its use on the roads, it did
not change the general perception of how roads were used. However, the invention of the

46

Peter D Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City, 1st ed, Inside
technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).
47
Longhurst, supra note 1 at 12.
48
Ibid at 13.
49
Norton, supra note 46 at 1.
50
Ibid at 2.
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automobile created a series of conflicts on how the streets were and should be
understood. Norton identifies social groups that claimed different perceptions of the
streets: pedestrians, safety reformers, police, street railways, Downtown Business
Associations – called Business Improvement Associations (BIA) in Canada, traffic
engineers, and the automobile industry. 51 Pedestrians, parents, police, and downtown
business associations tried to preserve the streets as they were perceived before: a
common place for people to walk and meet. Drivers and the automobile industry, on the
other hand, wished for streets with no obstructions for cars. The new conflicts caused by
the automobile made these social groups more cohesive, 52 as people either identified
themselves as pedestrians or drivers.
In the context of the streets, Norton defines as technological frame the approach
to traffic problems shared by a relevant social group.53 The technological frame of “angry
pedestrians” and parents worried about children’s safety was justice. 54 The police’s
technological frame was order. Street railways, chambers of commerce, engineers hired
by them, and, before the mid 1920s, the automobile industry fought congestion and had a
technological frame called efficiency.55 The automobile industry, however, soon decided
that it would be better for their business to have a positive perception of the automobile.
They found it in the idea of freedom, which became their own technological frame.56
The processes through which each of these different accounts of the automobile
have vanished, resulting in only one surviving interpretation, are called closure and
51
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stabilization. 57 Closure happens when interpretation flexibility declines, followed by
stabilization, which is the prevalence of one interpretation. 58 In 1930, people not
following the rules as they crossed the street would agree that they were jaywalking. In
1920, however, most would disagree with the term.59 In other words, even if people in
1930 disagreed that jaywalking was wrong, they would do so under the definition of
jaywalking that was already stabilized.
It is important to note that after closure problems might continue and even get
worse, but the solutions for them are often stuck within the given interpretation.60 This
helps explain the current legislation against jaywalking and the continuing attempt to
reduce road deaths by controlling the behaviour of pedestrians and cyclists.
Norton identifies three closure mechanisms. The first, rhetorical closure, happens
when “promotional language is used to assert the success of the new way, much as
advertising promotes a product.” 61 Through the mechanism of rhetorical closure, the
automobile industry managed to claim the success of the car, despite all the congestion
and road deaths.
The second closure mechanism is the redefinition of the problem. During the first
years of the advent of the automobile, nuisances caused by it were considered unfair. The
problem was defined as “what is just?” 62 Traffic engineers, working for downtown
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business associations, defined the problem as “what is efficient?” 63 As the matters of
fairness and efficiency counted negatively for the automobile industry, a new definition
of the problem was found by the mid 1920s: “what is freedom?”64 Considering driving a
matter of freedom, the problems of fairness and efficiency could be overlooked.
Norton calls the third mechanism “closure by control of use and misuse”65, which
refers to the understanding of what the streets are for. Before the 1920s, automobiles
were considered a misuse of the streets 66. In the middle of the 1920s, the automobile
industry worked on the notion that cars belonged in the streets. With this notion, road
deaths and congestion were to be fought by means that did not affect the existence of the
automobile on the roads.
Currently, the interpretation of the automobile has stabilized: cars are seen as a
symbol of success; every attempt to supress their use is deemed to supress driver’s
freedom; and there is a general understanding that cars belong to the roads.
Blame
Leandro Karnal, a Brazilian philosopher, once said that the cell phone is a value
in Western society, since people die for them.67 In his explanation of this statement, he
gave the example of people dying as they drive and check their cell phones. People risk
their lives, he says, for the cell phone. It is interesting in this thought how car driving is
taken for granted, while using the cell phone is not. If a person is driving a car and,
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distracted, hits a wall, the damage will be extremely different from if the same person
were walking and hit the same wall. The factor of danger for Karnal, however, is the cell
phone, because the car is too integrated in our modern daily commute to even be noted.
In fact, nowadays, when somebody is hit by a car, many elements may be
considered as the cause. Was the driver drunk? Were the road conditions appropriate?
Was the pedestrian jaywalking? These are questions that might arise, and they show that
the blame for a person’s death may be put on either the motorist, the municipality or the
pedestrian themselves. Naturally, many other actors might be blamed depending on the
circumstances.
Although posing these questions might seem obvious now, before the mid-1920s,
the blame for road deaths was immediately put on cars and motorists.68 It was common
for the driver to suffer “mob attacks” when they hit a pedestrian, especially if the
pedestrian was a child. 69 In popular perception, cars were considered inherently
dangerous. Motorists, intrinsically related to their cars, were dangerous as well. 70 No
distinction would be made between responsible and irresponsible drivers.71 Newspapers
would depict automobiles as “juggernauts”, publishing cartoons in which cars were
monsters that kill children.72
The safety publicity of the early 1920s showed the victims of automobiles as
children and young females.73 The motorists were personified either in the image of death
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or a reckless male driver.74 For Norton, the popular and official attacks on motorists were
based on the perception that driving was not a necessity; 75 therefore, the deaths caused by
driving were all intolerable. As it was widely understood during the advent of the
automobile, the element that made cars so dangerous was speed. 76 As an example, Norton
says that, in 1920, “[a]s the Milwaukee chamber was organizing a local safety council, it
bought a full-page newspaper advertisement blaming accidents simply on a ‘never-ending
call for speed.’”77
Only more than a decade later would the blame on speed be questioned. In the
mid-1920s, some newspaper commentaries would blame careless driving, claiming that
speed was not the dangerous factor.78 This shows the process by which people got used to
cars and their speed in the streets. Since they now belonged to the streets and people were
used to their speed, cars were not to blame anymore for all the road deaths that only rose
exponentially after the advent of the automobile.

The rebirth of the bicycle
Around the 1970s, the dominance of the automobile started to be challenged.
Traffic jam, road deaths, pollution, and oil wars were some of the reasons for the
appearance of social movements that rejected the gas-powered vehicles. Since then, many
associations and informal movements have surged with the intent to change the way
people move in cities. Walking and taking public transit are some of the solutions to
74
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reduce car-dependency, but the rediscovery of the bicycle as means of transportation has
been leading a new way of perceiving the streets.
Kindling the discussion on bicycle mobility is an event called Critical Mass.
Happening in 300 cities all over the world, its riders cycle around cities, bringing
visibility to active modes of transportation.

79

Repudiating hierarchical ways of

organization, the rides tend to be spontaneous, without a central command. As a result,
the way the Critical Mass riders act changes from place to place and from time to time. A
central characteristic of Critical Mass is that it is a place of discussion, bringing to more
people the debate regarding modes of transportation. Starting its rides in 1992 in San
Francisco,80 Critical Mass has had several problems, such as the tendency to reinforce
sexism through male exhibition of aggressiveness 81 and the lack of low-income
participants, 82 who are generally the ones who suffer the most from the automobilecentred city.83 However, it is also true that many current cycling mobilizations are a result
of Critical Mass’ encounters, which puts the event in a special place when it comes to the
return of the bicycle in public discussions.
Along with the informal Critical Masses, cycling associations were formed in
order to advocate for cycling safety and infrastructure, and are also active in many cities
throughout the world. In Ontario, Cycle Toronto and Bike Windsor Essex are examples
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of these entities. The associations have a political role of convincing governments and
legislatures to pass initiatives that promote urban cycling.
Less related to advocacy, informal cycling groups were also formed to use the
bicycle as an instrument of leisure. These groups gather to ride around the city, usually at
night. These events also happen all over the world and are extremely diverse in how their
riders act politically. While some are also cycling advocates, others understand cycling
solely as a leisure activity, using their cars to commute. Although their many effects on
urban cycling are objects of controversy, it is undeniable that their huge number of riders
gives the bicycle visibility in the streets.
The sum of cycling advocacy and activism, added to the rediscovery of its use as
a form of leisure, has pressed the public debate regarding how people move around cities.
After decades of work, cycling advocates are being able to show the inefficiencies of
automobility, but not without a strong backlash.
One of the clearest illustrations of the backlash was former Toronto mayor Rob
Ford’s statement on cyclists’ deaths. Ford said that the deaths are the cyclists’ fault, since
the roads are made for cars.84 As shown in this chapter, roads existed before automobiles.
Their quality improved greatly with the good roads movements, of which cyclists were an
important part, also before the advent of automobiles. Perhaps Ford’s statement was one
more populist act in his strategy to be noticed though polemicizing – Ford was not yet
mayor at the time of the speech. However, his ideas resonated in the minds of many
people as a result of the huge campaign from the
84
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towards understanding cars as belonging in the streets. More radically, it could be said
that there is an understanding that the streets belong to cars and their owners. The belief
that paying taxes related to car ownership and purchase of oil gives one the right to the
road is part of that way of thinking.
Cycling advocates are confronting the backlash by collecting data and relying on
academics and professionals from several fields. In some cases, however, that doesn’t
seem to be enough. Blue shares an instance when she was presenting the benefits of
cycling and a city planner confronted her: the city planner only seemed convinced when
Blue said that a rival city (in football) was investing in becoming cycling-friendly. 85
Decades of automobility-centrism has made it difficult for professionals to change their
way of doing things.
For Norcliffe, three factors are responsible for the low use of bicycles: highpressure lifestyles that limit people’s time to use them; the comfort of driving, which
requires less effort than cycling; and the fear of cycling. 86 The first and third factors are
more anecdotal than factual. In many large cities, which usually face heavy traffic
congestion, commuting by bicycle may be faster than commuting by car. In many
capitals of Brazilian states, Intermodal Challenge is an annual experiment in which
people go from one place to another using different means of transportation – the context
tries to get as close as possible to a commuting experience during regular hours of work.
The person on a bicycle always arrives faster than the one on a car.
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The fear of cycling may be factual in the sense that people do fear cycling,
however the fear does not correspond to the actual danger. First, the perception of danger
is exaggerated due to a lack of experience cycling on the streets – it appears less
dangerous the more experience one has, not only because of the acquired ability in
cycling but also because cyclists get used to having cars around them. The less a person
cycles, the more they tend to think it is dangerous. Second, the perception of danger for
cycling is obfuscated by the normalization of the danger of driving, as discussed in this
chapter in the previous section of blame. Driving is exponentially more dangerous than
cycling – the number of deaths did not rise with the advent of the bicycle the way they
did with the advent of automobiles. Claiming that cycling is dangerous may reinforce that
driving is not, or that the danger of the cycling-driving relation remains due to the cycling
factor.
In fact, data on cycling deaths tend to hide the danger of the automobile. The
Canadian Motor Vehicle Traffic Collision Statistics 2016 shows that 906 drivers, 358
passengers, 334 pedestrians, and 42 bicyclists died in 2016.87 What the statistics do not
show is how many pedestrians and cyclists died in a collision with a motorized vehicle.
Hiding that most, if not all, pedestrians and cyclists’ deaths had an automobile as part of
the event masks that the automobile is involved in virtually all road deaths. The number
as is presented – 334 pedestrians, 42 bicyclists – make it seem dangerous to walk or
cycle.
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In the case of Ontario, the Preliminary 2016 Ontario Road Safety Annual Report
Selected Statistics shows that 226 drivers, 82 passengers, 96 pedestrians, and 15
bicyclists died in 2016.88 In a separated table, the report shows that, from the total of 439
fatal collisions, passenger cars were involved in 433 of them, passenger vans in 31,
pickup trucks in 102, delivery vans in 10, large trucks in 93, among other vehicles.
Bicycles are cited in the broad category of “other”, therefore there is no number available
specifically related to them. This last table seems to better depict how motorized vehicles
are present in virtually all road deaths – hitting either each other or pedestrians and
cyclists.
Concerned about the death of cyclists, the Chief Coroner of Ontario published the
Cycling Death Review in 2012 with recommendations for changes in the areas of
infrastructure, education, legislation, and enforcement. 89 Although comprehensive and
correctly under the presumption that all cycling fatalities are preventable, 90 the review
unintentionally starts from the socially constructed perception that cars, speed, and
danger belong to the roads. It refers, for example, to cyclists as being eight times more
likely to suffer fatal injury,91 however does not mention which vehicle is more likely to
cause someone’s death. An important contribution of the report is the data that considers
the different types of cycling activity: it shows that 63% of the cycling fatalities happened
during recreational cycling, while only 31% happened during commuting and 6% during
88
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sport cycling. 92 The report does not mention the percentage of daily cycling that is
destined to each of these activities, however these numbers show that cycling commuting
deaths may be much lower than what we usually see in statistics.
Although cycling is only a part of the solution that must include public transit,
walking and many changes in city planning, cyclists are on the front line when it comes
to advocacy for urban reform. Their push has forced governments and legislatures to
rethink many aspects of how cycling is addressed. This thesis is a result of and an
attempted contribution to this push in the field of how cycling is perceived in law, as will
be discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
WHO LEGALLY BELONGS TO THE ROAD?

Although road deaths only became an epidemic after the advent of the
automobile, conflicts between road users had previously been experienced between
people using different modes of transportation. Many of these conflicts ended up in
courts, which were forced to adjudicate on matters regarding each person’s rights
according to the mode of transportation they were using. Relatedly, legislatures have
passed laws affecting cycling, mostly motivated by the polemics that derive from these
conflicts.
This chapter will argue that legal regulation – through both court adjudication and
legislation – regarding cycling should consider the danger of the automobile. After
providing a brief history of cycling law, it will focus specifically on whether there should
be a strict liability rule for drivers when it comes to collisions involving cyclists.

Cycling law
Although several sources can be found on the old law of wheelmen, few legal
scholars have engaged in a discussion on cycling law in current times. This thesis
engages in the discussion proposed by Waters, who suggests the rebirth of cycling law as
a retrieval of the law of wheelmen. 93 The author tells the history of this field of law,
explaining that the bicycle is being promoted once again, which required a renewed legal
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attention to it, and sketches an agenda for the cycling legal field highlighting areas that
may be addressed.
Craig Forcese and Nicole LaViolette covered a broad range of legal topics in the
book Every Cyclist’s Guide to Canadian Law. 94 Aiming to inform cyclists of the law
rather than discuss the topics academically, the publication is considered “the first
comprehensive look at cycling law in Canada” following the advent of the automobile.95
It covers different areas of law that affect cycling, from tort law to criminal and traffic
law.
In Australia, Gabrielle Appleby and Adam Webster also discuss the law regarding
cycling in the article Cycling and the Law.96 Their piece shows the social pressure that
law faces regarding cycling, both from the cycling community who are pushing to make
cycling safer and from car-centrists who consider cycling a nuisance.
In the United States, Ross Petty addresses cycling as a sport activity under safety
law.97 Petty claims that cycling is a specially regulated sport – compared to swimming,
for example – due to its use as a vehicle as well. The author proposes a framework for
safety law regarding cycling, making two divisions. First, he divides the law into the
topics of environment, user, and product. The second division is in the legal measures of
regulation (ex ante) and litigation (ex post). When it comes to the environment
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concerning the bicycle, for example, regulation covers road design, traffic signs, signals,
and anti-obstruction laws, while litigation is a result of negligent design or maintenance.98
An important difference between the legal work described above and the law of
wheelmen is that the former appears in the context of motorized roads. This means that
legal opinions are influenced by the social, car-centric assumptions that surround their
authors. Therefore, every legal decision regarding cycling should consider the existence
of these assumptions in order to be properly informed.
The historical construction of the law of wheelmen
There is a current understanding that people belong to sidewalks and vehicles
belong to the roads. This division was not always so clear. Historically, roads were public
spaces for people and vehicles. This assumption was “common sense” before the advent
of the automobile and was also established under the law. In Truman v Walgham (1766),
the King’s Bench decided that a person’s right to pass along a highway was “before all
prescriptions.”99
The advent of the velocipede marked the beginning of the conflict regarding who
legally belongs to the road and to the sidewalk. In 1869, a note in the American legal
journal Bench and Bar explained that a court decision was made that a toll collector
could not collect tolls from people on velocipedes.100 In Canada, the Upper Canada Court
of the Queen’s Bench decided that bicycles did not belong on the sidewalk for the
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specific purpose of interpreting a City of London by-law regarding sidewalk
obstruction.101 The ruling, however, does not mention that bicycles belong to the road.
Belonging to the road at that time, however, did not imply being a vehicle. It was
generally understood that roads were public spaces for different modes of transportation,
which included walking. As a legal scholar pointed out in 1895, the term road “is used to
express any surface over which men travel from one place to another, whether on foot, on
horseback, in carriages or in other vehicles.”102
The leading case determining that bicycles are carriages is the English decision of
Taylor v Goodwin. 103 The court decided that riding a bicycle means propelling it and
guiding it, as much as “an engine driver guides and drives a train.”104 A bicyclist was then
convicted on the grounds of “furious driving” as determined in the Highway Act. The
decision mentioned that the bicycle did not exist at the time the Act was passed.105 This
shows that, since the beginning, the legislation that applied to bicycles has not been made
for the bicycle – it took a common law decision to fit bicycle into the legislation under
the provision made for other vehicles. It is also interesting to note that it was a decision
against a cyclist that created the legal definition of cyclists belonging to the road.
Several other cases helped shape the role of bicycles on the roads. In the United
States, the Indiana Supreme Court confirmed in Holland v Bartch that bicycles are
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vehicles and have the same rights as horse-drawn carriages on the road.106 The same court
decided in Mercer v Corbin that bicycles were forbidden on sidewalks because they are
vehicles.107
The right to the road was taken to a higher degree by the Supreme Court of
Kansas in Swift v Topeka (City of). 108 In this decision, the Court established that
interpreting the ordinance to exclude bicycles from the roadway section of the bridge
would make the ordinance void. From the highest court of Kansas, people were given the
right to choose their mode of transportation on the roads (“mode of conveyance he
desires”).109 It was not thought that a mode of transportation could be invented in the
future as to create too much nuisance on the roads.
Contrary to the Supreme Court of Kansas’ decision was the Maryland Supreme
Court in Twilley v Perkins in 1893.110 In this case, the Court decided that the Legislature
has the power to restrict and forbid the use of particular vehicles due to the danger it
might cause to road users, therefore ruling that a statute can restrict the use of bicycles.
The decision does not forbid dangerous vehicles, but it permits legislatures to forbid
them. The characterization of the bicycle as dangerous is interesting, considering that the
number of road deaths was minimal compared to the number of road deaths after the
advent of the cars.
In Canada, case law regarding bicycles is not so rich as in the United States.
However, bicycles were a live topic of political and legal discussion. In Winnipeg,
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citizens, annoyed with the behaviour of cyclists on the road, met with the civic board of
works to propose a by-law prohibiting bicycle riding on sidewalks and limiting cycling
on roads to the maximum speed of eight miles per hour.111 Incoherently, the same text
proposed limiting cycling on sidewalks to the maximum speed of six miles per hour. The
mayor considered the limits too small, but the proposed by-law was sent to council. As a
response, a set of dedicated cycle paths were constructed.112 Years later, Manitoba would
pass a bill creating the first Cycle Path Board in Winnipeg, and the first to ever exist in
North America, in order to build a network of bicycle paths.113
This brief history of the law of wheelmen shows that the inclusion of bicycles in
legal matters regarding the roads happened after a series of social and legal struggles.
Statutes that regulate the use of vehicles were not made for the bicycle – it had to be
included as a vehicle in common law. Since the law of wheelmen, bicycles have lacked
proper regulations that take into consideration the bicycle’s particular characteristics.
The law regarding cycling must be analyzed in light of its historical construction.
Since most laws were originally made for horse-drawn carriages and cars, they might be
partially or totally unfit to regulate cycling. Moreover, laws made specifically to regulate
cycling – such as helmet laws – may be explained by the social construction of the idea
that cycling is dangerous, caused by the normalization of the danger inherent in driving.
As part of an effort to address one of the many areas of law that may and must be
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analyzed under the perspective of cycling law, the next section will focus on tort laws
regarding collisions involving motorized vehicles and bicycles.
Tort law
The simple act of cycling is regulated by many areas of law. Traffic law, the most
obvious of them, regulates what cyclists may and must do on the road. Another area of
law broadly discussed regarding cycling is criminal law. Angered by the low punishment
applied to drivers who kill cyclists and pedestrians, advocates have long called for a
Protecting Vulnerable Road Users Act in Ontario, 114 which, among other road safety
initiatives, would increase punishment for road killings.115 Adding to criminal law, tort
law also comes up after a road death or injury. Some road safety advocates do not
consider it efficient to affect drivers’ behaviour, since it usually affects the driver’s
insurance company rather than the driver themselves.116 It is true that tort law does not
come up in most recommendations regarding road safety. The World Health Organization
cites important law-related factors for road safety including reducing speed, increasing
motorcycle helmet use, reducing drink-driving, increasing seat-belt use, increasing child
restraint use, reducing drug-driving, and reducing distracted driving, with no mention of
tort law.117 Not surprisingly, the Insurance Bureau of Canada also omits tort law from the
factors that have affected the number of road deaths in Canada.118 Although it is not the
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intention of this thesis to challenge criminal law’s role in the topic, it is important to
consider that the many pledges for harsher criminal punishments for drivers should be
analyzed through the lens of the growing anti-prison literature.119
Despite its alleged inefficiency to reduce road deaths, tort law is the area of law
responsible for compensating the victims of road violence. This compensation, moreover,
is paid by the road user that causes road violence: the driver. It may be that the specific
driver that causes a specific death will not pay for that death if they are held liable, since
it is the insurance company that does so. However, the insurance premium is paid by
drivers in general. Since driving is the activity that raised road deaths to war numbers,
tort law, accompanied by insurance law, is the area of law that tends to allocate the costs
of road deaths to the road users that cause them. Furthermore, a closer look into
automotive tort law is important because collisions with motorized vehicles correspond to
one third of all unintentional injuries in Canada.120
Insurance law plays its role by guaranteeing the existence of funds to compensate
the victim and by distributing the costs to all drivers. Although it is seen as a measure to
protect the driver from possible liabilities, it ends up including road violence as one of the
costs of driving. Considering that cyclists and pedestrians – road users unrelated to
motorized vehicles – comprise 19% of road deaths in Canada,121 it is important to transfer
these costs to those who create risks on the roads.
In Canada, traffic legislation differs from province to province. Since different
rules of behaviour change the standard of care expected from road users, court decisions
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on tort also differ. The legislation differs on matters of what is allowed and what is
prohibited on the road, but it also differs on court procedure matters. The most important
procedure rule that affects cycling is the reverse onus of proof. In Ontario, for example,
the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) states that the driver of a motor vehicle is responsible for
proving they were not negligent in a collision.122 This means that, when a driver is sued
by a pedestrian or a cyclist who was hit by them, the driver’s negligence is a priori
presumed, which shifts from the plaintiff the burden to provide evidence of that.
This section will show how cases involving collisions between bicycles and motor
vehicles have been decided in Canada. Although tort law regarding bicycles is a broader
topic – it also involves collisions between two bicycles and state liability due to a failure
to provide good conditions for the road, for example – the scope of this thesis is limited
to collisions between bicycles and cars.
Reverse onus of proof
The Ontario HTA and the Alberta Highway Safety Act establish a reverse onus of
proof of negligence in cases of collisions involving motor vehicles.123 It is presumed that
the driver of the motor vehicle was negligent, so the plaintiff does not have to prove this
element. While this does not apply in collisions involving two motorized vehicles, this
procedural rule has been essential in cases involving cyclists. It is, indeed, difficult to
provide the negligence of the driver, since it is difficult to gather evidence of the level of
attention of the driver at the moment of the fact, for example. Without this rule,
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establishing the driver’s liability for negligence would be too difficult – as it happens in
provinces without the same rule.
Several cases in Ontario have been decided through the reverse onus of proof. In
Booth v Sault Ste Marie (City of), a cyclist was hit by the side of a bus during an
overtake.124 In front of both the cyclist and the bus was a parked car, which both were
approaching and planning to pass. The Ontario Court of Justice held that the bus driver
should have allowed sufficient distance from the bicycle while overtaking it – and that it
was reasonable for the cyclist to imagine the driver would do so. The reverse onus of
proof was essential in this case, because it was held that the driver did not prove that he
was not negligent while overtaking the bicycle.
Pelletier v Ontario establishes that having the right of way is insufficient to prove
that the driver was not negligent. 125 In this case, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
held that a cyclist was contributorily negligent because he was riding on the sidewalk and
without any lights. The driver was considered to have the right of way, but, according to
the Court, that was not enough to prove that he was not negligent. It was held that the
driver should have reduced speed since the intersection he was crossing was a busy one.
Another interesting case on the reverse onus of proof is DeJussel v Hajzer. 126 In
this case, a driver was held partially liable for hitting a cyclist on a highway in which
bicycles were forbidden. The cyclist was considered contributorily negligent for not using
lights and for riding where it was not allowed. However, the Ontario Supreme Court held
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that the fact that bicycles were forbidden was not enough to discharge the driver from its
duty of proving he was not negligent.
The importance of Ontario’s reverse onus of proof is highlighted when compared
to case law in other jurisdictions. In British Columbia, for example, such a rule does not
exist. As a result, in Miles v Kumar, the British Columbia Supreme Court dismissed an
action by a cyclist against the driver that hit him. 127 The driver did not advance any
positive defence and chose not to testify, relying simply on the argument that the cyclist
did not prove her negligence. In this case, the cyclist was wearing a high visibility jacket
with rear lights on at 10am. He checked twice whether it was safe to change lanes and
signaled before moving to the next lane. Despite of all these elements taken as fact by the
court, it was decided that the driver’s negligence was not proven.
In the same province, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held in McIlvenna
(Litigation Guardian of) v Viebig that the cyclist hit by a car at an intersection did not
prove that the driver was negligent, even though the bicycle had the right of way. 128 The
cyclist was six years old at the time of the collision.
As the case law demonstrates, the reverse onus of proof plays an important role in
establishing the driver’s liability when a cyclist is hit. It is extremely difficult to prove
that a driver was negligent, since the cyclist’s total obedience to the rules does not
suffice. The lack of this rule in British Columbia has resulted in cyclists not being
compensated at all for their injuries sustained in collisions with motor vehicles. This not
only leaves cyclists unprotected, but also creates a permissive environment surrounding
127
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the drivers’ conduct, supported by the fact that, as long as a driver respects all the rules of
the road, it is okay to kill or injure cyclists.
Overtake distance
In Ontario, a motor vehicle driver must allow a minimum safety distance of one
metre from the bicycle during overtake. 129 Some jurisdictions outside of Canada
determine a higher distance. In both Brazil and Portugal, the safety distance to pass a
cyclist is 1.5 metres.130 Although many provinces in Canada do not have such a rule, it is
generally established that a driver has to secure all road users’ safety while passing
another vehicle.
In Booth Estate v Sault Ste. Marie (City), the failure of the bus driver to allow a
safe distance when overtaking the cyclist, resulting in a collision with the latter, was an
important element for the Ontario Court of Justice to determine the driver’s liability to
the damages caused to the cyclist.131 A different result, however, came from Ryder v Gray
Coach Lines Ltd. 132 In this case, the Ontario Court of Appeal had to decide who, between
two drivers, was liable for the death of a cyclist. The cyclist was passing a parked car,
while a bus driver was overtaking the cyclist. The motorist of the parked car opened the
door, causing the cyclist to fall under the bus’s rear wheel. The court held that the driver
of the parked car was fully liable for that death. Therefore, it did not consider that the bus
driver should have left more distance from the cyclist.
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Despite British Columbia’s cycling advocates’ demands,133 the province does not
have a specific safe passing distance rule regarding bicycles. However, the Motor Vehicle
Act (MVA) determines that a driver has to maintain a safe distance when overtaking
another vehicle. 134 The Government of British Columbia’s website suggests drivers
maintain a distance of one meter from cyclists.135 Case law also asserts the driver’s role to
keep a safe distance in British Columbia. In MacEachern (Committee of) v Rennie, the
British Columbia Supreme Court determined that the driver had to maintain a safe
distance from a cyclist.136 In this case, it was held that, even if the cyclist was in another
lane, it was not enough for the truck driver to avoid crossing the “fog line”. The driver’s
failure to maintain a safe passing distance resulted in a collision with the cyclist, for
whose damages the driver was held liable. The cyclist, however, was held contributorily
negligent because she could have waited for the truck to have passed before she tried to
go around the vehicle parked on the shoulder where she was riding. In Dupre v Patterson,
the same Court held that a car driver was totally liable for the damages caused to a cyclist
hit during an overtake for failing to maintain a safe distance. 137 The cyclist was held not
to be contributorily negligent, even though she was not riding as far right as possible, as
determined by the MVA.138
Case law shows that the one metre rule in Ontario had not affected tort cases to
date, since securing safety while passing another vehicle is a general rule that is sufficient
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for liability assessments. The rule, however, is not at all useless. It can be enforced by the
police and is also a reference for drivers who otherwise might not have an idea of how
much distance should be kept from cyclists.
Dooring
A common collision cause between cyclists and drivers is dooring. Dooring is the
act of hitting a cyclist by opening the door of the vehicle. 139 Safety campaigns have urged
drivers to look for cyclists before opening the door. A measure to ensure this is called the
Dutch Reach, which consists of opening the door with the right hand, forcing the driver
to move the body to have a better view of oncoming traffic.140 The Vienna Convention on
Road Traffic prohibits drivers from opening the door without securing that other roadusers will not be endangered. 141 Although Canada is not a party to the Convention, 142
provinces generally have similar legislation regarding opening doors with caution. In
Ontario, the HTA prohibits opening the door of a motor vehicle without ensuring that this
act will not endanger other persons or vehicles. 143 British Columbia’s MVA prohibits
opening the door of a motor vehicle on the side of moving traffic unless it is safe to do
so.144
In the Ontario case, Ryder v Gray Coach Lines Ltd, a motorist was held liable for
the damages caused after the door was opened carelessly, hitting a cyclist that
139
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subsequently fell under a bus wheel.145 The liability fell entirely on the car driver, since
the bus driver was not held liable for failing to maintain a safe distance from the bicycle.
A similar case happened in Manitoba, Frederick v Northern Taxi Limited.146 A cyclist
was struck by a door opened carelessly by a taxi driver, subsequently falling under a
truck’s wheel. The Manitoba King’s Bench held that the taxi driver was fully liable for
the damages caused to the cyclist.
Further, in Ontario, in Evans v Toronto (City of), a cyclist fell after hitting a car’s
door that was opened abruptly on a road that was considered a bicycle route before the
incident.147 The cyclist was found to be contributorily negligent for failing to use a helmet
and not checking the interior of the car. The City of Toronto was also held liable, because
of the bad conditions of the road. The driver who opened the door irresponsibly was held
only 50% liable.
Safety campaigns should be advertised in order to make it a habit to look for
cyclists before opening doors, and statutes need to be changed to specify this obligation
with proper fines. Even without specific norms regarding dooring, however, courts in
Canada have been aware of the problem in tort cases, finding drivers negligent when they
hit a cyclist with the vehicle’s door.
Cyclist helmets
One of the most controversial topics regarding cycling as means of transportation
is the use of the helmet. Some jurisdictions inside and outside Canada require all cyclists
to wear it, while others require it only for children or do not require it at all. Heated
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discussions occur about whether helmets should be mandatory. Academic research is
available proving points on both sides of the debate.148
The introduction of the helmet topic when it comes to modern cycling safety is a
distortion. Historically, bicycle helmets were invented to protect cyclists falling by
themselves onto the pavement.149 They harken back to the era of the high-wheelers, a
bicycle which caused many cyclists to fall due to its design.150 The use of bicycle helmets
was deemed as a matter of individual choice until race organizers made them
mandatory. 151 Due to the competitive nature of a race, the risk of a cyclist falling is
naturally high, which makes helmets important as safety equipment.
The advent of the safety bicycle saw the risk of falling decrease dramatically,
which brought seniors and women to use bicycles as means of transportation. The
“macho bicycles,” on which men would show their bravery by facing the risks of the
high-wheelers, gave way to the modern vehicle whose risk of falling in controlled
environments is extremely low. The use of a helmet, which had never been popular for
means of transportation, by an experienced cyclist in these circumstances became

148

See for example D L Robinson, “Head Injuries and Bicycle Helmet Laws” (1996) 28:4 Accident Analysis
& Prevention 463; Susan T Borglund, Janice S Hayes & Jeanne M Eckes, “Florida’s Bicycle Helmet Law and
a Bicycle Safety Educational Program: Did They Help?” (1999) 25:6 Journal of emergency nursing 496;
Hanyu Ni et al, “Evaluation of a Statewide Bicycle Helmet Law Via Multiple Measures of Helmet Use”
(1997) 151:1 Archives of pediatrics & adolescent medicine 59; Peter C Scheidt, Modena H Wilson & Melvin
S Stern, “Bicycle Helmet Law for Children: A Case Study of Activism in Injury Control” (1992) 89:6
Pediatrics 1248; Paul Scuffham et al, “Head Injuries to Bicyclists and the New Zealand Bicycle Helmet Law”
(2000) 32:4 Accident Analysis & Prevention 565; Matthew Taylor & P Scuffham, “New Zealand Bicycle
Helmet Law—Do the Costs Outweigh the Benefits?” (2002) 8:4 Injury Prevention 317; David E Wesson et
al, “Trends in Pediatric and Adult Bicycling Deaths Before and After Passage of a Bicycle Helmet Law”
(2008) 122:3 Pediatrics 605.
149
“History Tuesday: The Bicycle Helmet”, (14 May 2013), online: Davison
<https://www.davison.com/blog/2013/05/14/history-tuesday-the-bicycle-helmet/>.
150
Randy Swart, “Bicycle Helmet History”, (8 October 2017), online: Helmets
<https://helmets.org/history.htm>.
151
Petty, supra note 97 at 207.

41

pointless. The motorization of the streets, however, increased the danger of the roads,
elevating the number of deaths and injuries in all modes of transportation. Bicycles were
not immune to this, with a high number of cyclists starting to be killed or injured by
drivers every year.
The debate over helmet use to avoid part of these deaths, however, did not come
simply from the existence of the deaths themselves. Even more pedestrians and motor
vehicle drivers and passengers die yearly from road crashes. If helmets resulted only from
an intention to avoid deaths, they would be recommended and made mandatory for
pedestrians and motor vehicle drivers and passengers as well. Nonetheless, that did not
happen.
As discussed in the last chapter, the advent of the automobile came with a great
investment by the motor industry to stabilize the notion that cars belong to the roads.
Motordom’s strategy was a reaction to safety movements that denounced that cars were
catastrophically elevating the number of road deaths. With the stabilization of that notion,
traditional road users, as cyclists, not only had to share the road with the danger of the
automobiles surrounding them, but also had to face new allegations that bicycles do not
belong to the road. This false assumption is still very strong in Canada, with Ford’s
opinion that cyclists are to blame for their own deaths because roads were made for
cars. 152 In Windsor, city councillor Paul Borrelli tweeted that he saw cyclists riding
“nicely” on sidewalks,153 provoking response from cycling advocates saying that cycling
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on sidewalks is, and should be, prohibited.154 The decrease of the perception that bicycles
belong to the road made sport and leisure cycling the main image of bicycling, with the
importance of competitions such as the Tour de France and the growing habit of group
riding for leisure taking over the social perception of bicycles. This confusion is
illustrated in Bekka Wright’s cartoon in which the author shows the amount of sport
cycling questions she receives when people see that she commutes by bicycle. 155 As a
response for these questions, she drew a person dressed as a Formula One driver in order
to drive a car to work.156
It is the strong image of sport cycling that creates the perceptive relationship
between cycling and helmets. In places where the cycling commute is popular – such as
Holland or the poor suburbs of Brazil, or even in North America before the advent of the
automobiles – helmet use has never been a norm. The influence of sport cycling in the
social image of bicycles created the idea of helmet use to avoid deaths and injuries of
cyclists, even though the deaths and injuries caused by the advent of the automobiles
affected all road users with no exception.
Many studies have been made to demonstrate the consequences of mandatory
helmet laws. It has been mainly proven that these laws increase bicycle helmet use and
decrease cyclists’ head injuries. 157 However, helmet laws for motor vehicle occupants
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could be 17 times more effective preventing head injury than bicycle helmet laws,
according to a research that compares the number of head injuries in different modes of
transportation in Australia.158 Indeed, scientists are part of society and, therefore, tend to
carry social assumptions, which includes the idea of who belongs to the road and the
constructed image of bicycles, with its relation to helmets. Ulrich Beck has long
advocated for the opening up of the decision-making processes of sciences, since they are
based on “relations of definitions” that are the “hidden power-structure of risk
conflicts.” 159 If legal and political decisions are based on scientific conclusions, it is
important to scrutinize the definitions that influence the results achieved in science.
When it comes to helmet law, it is the imagery of sport cycling present in the mind of
some scientists that results in the conclusion that helmets should be mandatory for
cyclists, while ignoring that the same methods would lead to the same conclusion in
respect to helmets for motor vehicle occupants and pedestrians.
Cycling advocates have argued that helmet laws negatively influence the use of
bicycles, resulting in the decrease in health benefits caused by cycling outweighing the
alleged decrease in head injuries. Although there is a lack of relevant research evaluating
the specific effect of helmet laws in decreasing bicycle use, 160 it has been noted that bikeshare systems tend to fail in places where helmets are mandatory.161
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In tort law, the artificial relationship between urban cycling and helmets has
played a relevant role in denying cyclists full compensation for damages caused by motor
vehicle drivers. Even though Ontario has no mandatory helmet law for cyclists over 18
years old, it has been decided that not wearing a helmet constitutes contributory
negligence.162 However, there has to be evidence that a helmet would prevent or mitigate
the damages – even in British Columbia, where helmets are mandatory for cyclists of all
ages. 163 In Krudwig v Johnston, the Ontario Court of Justice denied the existence of
contributory negligence because there was no evidence that it would have made any
difference on the damages, but also because “there was no law requiring the plaintiff to
wear a bicycle helmet.”164 None of these decisions provide any justification for imposing
contributory negligence, which leads to the conclusion that the court judges simply
assumed that cyclists should be wearing helmets, except in Krudwig v Johnston. Only a
short discussion on helmet use is found in Labanowicz v Fort Erie (Town), in which a
witness doctor was reported to cite the percentage of brain injuries avoided by helmets. 165
The court’s decision in this case, however, was for the inexistence of contributory
negligence, which should be proven on a case-by-case basis.
No case law has determined contributory negligence of pedestrians or car
occupants for not wearing helmets. Decisions on cyclists’ contributory negligence for that
reason, therefore, are an injustice caused by the imaginary relationship between urban
cycling and helmets. In the United States, the city of Deerfield, Illinois, came to a
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solution for that injustice: the section in the Municipal Code that requires helmets for
persons under the age of 16 clearly states that the violation of this same section does not
constitute negligence or contributory negligence:
A violation of this Section shall not constitute negligence, contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, be considered in mitigation of damages of
whatever nature, be admissible in evidence, or be the subject of comment
by counsel in any action for the recovery of damages arising out of the
operation of any bicycle, or participation in skateboarding or in-line
skating, nor shall anything in this Section change any existing law, rule or
procedure pertaining to any civil action.166
Helmet laws for urban cycling are a distortion caused by the presence of sport
cycling imagery. Although more relevant research is needed, helmet laws produce the
unintended consequences of discouraging cycling. While they do reduce head injuries,
they would be 17 times more efficient to reduce head injuries for car occupants if they
were mandatory. The imposition of contributory negligence for not wearing a helmet
causes the denial of the total compensation that the cyclist deserves due to the negligence
of drivers. As a result, the driver pays less for the inflicted damages, the cyclist is not
fully compensated, and there is no evidence whatsoever that the imposition of
contributory negligence has had any efficacy in reducing injuries and deaths. It is unjust,
ineffective, and should be abolished in all jurisdictions.
Cyclists passing on the right
In order to organize the roads, rules regarding overtakes have been established.
Generally, lane speeds are lower on the right and faster on the left. Overtakes are
expected to be made on the left lane, and the driver is expected to return to the right lane
after passing the other vehicle. All these rules were, naturally, made with motor vehicles
166
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in mind. Their increased danger requires more specific rules and their size require a more
rigid order on the roads. For the same reasons, no overtaking rules exist for pedestrians
on sidewalks. Cyclists, however, were deemed vehicles by the courts, which artificially
imposed on them rules made for the logics of, before, horse carriages and, now, motor
vehicles. As a result, the general prohibition of passing on the right applies to bicycles.
Cyclists passing on the right are a common image on the roads when cars are
stopped before them. Almost as a confession, Forcese says that he “has certainly
imagined he travels up an invisible bike lane to the right of stalled traffic.”167 That is not
at all illogical. It is not reasonable to demand that a cyclist waits before stopped cars,
considering that one of the social benefits of the bicycle is not causing traffic jams. Since
cyclists generally travel on the right, it is natural that the overtake occurs on the right.
When a bike box – a reserved space for cyclists to wait before the red light in front of
other stopped vehicles – is installed, it is recommended that an ingress lane for bicycles is
placed on the right, so that cyclists can comfortably pass stalled vehicles.168
In Brazil, advocates rely on article 211 of Código Brasileiro de Trânsito, which
prescribes that non-motorized vehicles may pass vehicles stopped due to traffic signals.169
With no such prescription, Canadian courts have varied their interpretation on the matter.
In British Columbia, courts have been severe against cyclists passing on the right. In Ilett
v Buckley, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that a cyclist was contributorily
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negligent for a collision at an intersection because he infringed the statutory prohibition
to pass on the right.170 The cyclist, however, did so “at speed”, which means that the fact
that he passed on the right was not considered alone. It is important to notice that the
cyclist was on the right shoulder of a highway. It would be absurd to suggest that cyclists
on the right shoulder should stop before motor vehicles on travel lanes. The court,
however, did not bother to explain what a cyclist should do to avoid infringing the law in
that situation.
An even more unreasonable decision was made by the same court in Ormiston
(Litigation guardian of) v Insurance Corp. of British Columbia.171 In this case, a van was
stopped in the right lane, close to the centre line and three feet from the fog line. The 16year-old cyclist decided to pass the van on the right, when it, for no apparent reason,
abruptly accelerated moving to the right, going around a foot and a half to two feet over
the fog line. It did not hit the cyclist, but caused him to lose his balance, cross the right
shoulder and fall down a rocky embankment. The court came to the absurd conclusion
that, even if the driver had seen the cyclist in the mirror, he could have made the same
movement, since it was “the vehicle’s lane.”172 Endangering the life of a human being is
justified if the sanctity of the motor vehicle’s lane is threatened. It was concluded that the
cyclist did a “foolish thing” and was “the sole author of his misfortune.”173
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In Hill v Reekie, the British Columbia Supreme Court denied any compensation
for a cyclist that hit a trailer while he was attempting to pass the trailer on the right. 174
The cyclist lost his balance and fell under the rear wheels of the motor vehicle. The court
defined the occurrence as a “highly unfortunate accident.” 175 The case shows the
assumption and acceptance by the British Columbia Supreme Court that roads are a space
in which little mistakes can result in heavy injuries. The motor industry invested heavily
to establish this assumption in the first decades of the automobile, and now it is secured
by the courts.
Courts in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario have been less severe than
those in British Columbia. In Birch v Eastern Dairyfoods Co-Operative Ltd, the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia stated that “it would be illogical to say a cyclist must pass on the
left in traffic when he is required to drive on the extreme right.”176 In this case, a truck
driver hit a cyclist while turning into a driveway to the right. Although the cyclist was
held contributorily negligent, it was not due to the fact that he was passing on the right.
This decision cites a previous case from New Brunswick on the same line of
thought. In Guimont v Williston, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal stated that “[i]t
would not be logical to require that a bicycle rider pull out toward the centre of the
highway to pass ordinary moving traffic on the highway; the speed at which a bicycle
travels would not justify such a requirement.”177 Passing on the right did not constitute
contributory negligence in this case as well.
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Similar reasoning is applied in Ontario. In Tiessen v Lackner, the Ontario County
Court held that “[t]o hold that a cyclist cannot pass without moving to the left on a two
lane or multi-lane roadway would be a ridiculous conclusion and contrary to the
established practice.”178 Interestingly, the court held that the prohibition of passing to the
right refers only to motor vehicles. Indeed, the HTA states specifically the words “motor
vehicle” in section 150 (1), which permits passing on the right only in certain
situations.179 As mentioned by the court, “that Section only applies to motor vehicles and,
while a bicycle is a ‘vehicle’ it is not a ‘motor vehicle.’”180
It would be interesting to know why the British Columbia MVA prohibits all
vehicles from passing on the right, while the Ontario HTA only prohibits motor vehicles.
Most probably the respective section in the MVA was not thought of for vehicles that are
not motorized. Bicycles were simply not thought about in that situation, and it was taken
to the courts to rule over them. As a result of a literal and blind application of the statute,
the British Columbia courts ended up holding that cyclists cannot pass on the right. This
conclusion is at extreme odds with the dynamics of the bicycle, as concluded by the
courts in Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, and as ruled in the Brazilian traffic
code.
Motor vehicles turning to the right
A common source of conflicts between motor vehicle drivers and cyclists is the
right turn by the motor vehicle. Since cyclists are legally obligated to ride on the right,
drivers who intend to turn to the right should wait behind the cyclist at a safe distance
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until it is possible to turn right safely. Although only seconds are lost in this procedure, it
is common that drivers try to pass the cyclist quickly in order to turn to the right in front
of them. As a result, cyclists are hit or lose their balance, falling to the ground. When
motor vehicles are stopped or travelling at a slow speed, it is common for cyclists to pass
on the right, as seen in the previous section. In this situation, it is important for the driver
to watch for cyclists in the mirror.
In the Ontario case, Krudwig v Johnston, a truck driver was held 100% liable for
hitting a cyclist while turning to the right without signaling.181 The cyclist was passing the
truck on the right at that time, but this fact was not raised by the defendant as a possible
cause for contributory negligence. In Dolphin v Lepine the British Columbia Supreme
Court held the cyclist contributorily negligent in a similar situation.182 Most importantly
for this section is that the driver was held partially liable for not looking out for cyclists
when turning to the right – more specifically for not doing a right shoulder check.
Therefore, even though the court understood that cyclists cannot pass on the right, it did
not disregard the driver’s role to look out for them. Unfortunately, the same court came to
a different conclusion in Sivasubramaniam v Franz.183 In this case, the cyclist was on the
right shoulder and stopped at the red light beside a truck. When the light went green, the
truck driver did a right turn, hitting the cyclist. The court held the cyclist totally liable
because he should not be riding on the shoulder. Since it is an area not designated for
vehicles, the court understood that the cyclist had the duty to assure that he was visible to
drivers on the road. The relevant difference to Dolphin v Lepine is that, in the latter, the
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driver did not do a right shoulder check, which would have allowed him to see the cyclist
and, therefore, avoid the collision. The breach of this duty constituted negligence,
according to the British Columbia Supreme Court. As Sivasubramaniam v Franz shows,
the court understands that, as long as all the statutory duties are met, drivers are allowed
to hit cyclists with no liability.
Riding on the shoulder
Debating whether a cyclist should ride on the shoulder is one of the unreasonable
consequences of the motorization of road infrastructure and laws. At a motorized
standpoint, driving on the shoulder is forbidden because it would undermine its capability
of providing a space for emergencies. Allowing driving on the shoulder would simply
transform it into a regular traffic lane. Moreover, it would be dangerous for people
stopped on the shoulder in a situation of emergency. Bicycles do not cause such threat. In
fact, riding on the shoulder may be safer for cyclists, who have to constantly be
concerned about drivers overtaking them in the traffic lane. The legal prohibition of
driving on the shoulder was intended for motorized vehicles. Some jurisdictions clearly
state that cyclists may ride on the shoulder, as an exception to the prohibition, such as
Ontario.184 Others, such as British Columbia, apply the statute norms strictly, disallowing
cyclists on the shoulder for no other reason than the literal application of a law not made
for them.
Two cases in British Columbia show how the prohibition of cyclists on the road
result in cyclists being denied compensation for their losses. In Ormiston, the British
Columbia Court of Appeal held that the cyclist was solely responsible for being hit by a
184
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van.185 The cyclist was passing the van on the right on a road that had a right shoulder.
The court decided that the driver was not responsible for looking for cyclists on the
shoulder since they are forbidden there. The British Columbia Supreme Court had the
same understanding in Sivasubramaniam v Franz discussed in the previous section. 186
The same Supreme Court, however, came to a different conclusion in MacEachern
(Committee of) v Rennie, in which it was stated that the driver of a large commercial
vehicle “had a duty to provide enough room for pedestrians and cyclists to proceed safely
along the shoulder. It was not enough for him simply to keep his vehicle from
encroaching onto the nominal fog line.”187
Although, differently from Ontario, British Columbia does not have a statutory
exception to allow bicycles on the shoulders, that does not mean that the courts are
obligated to apply the statutes literally. Simply by recognizing that the prohibition to
drive on the shoulder was meant for motor vehicle drivers, the courts could infer that
cyclists are allowed there. Even more importantly, denying cyclists any compensation
after being struck by motor drivers sends the message that drivers do not need to check
the shoulder before entering it or taking a right turn. In other words, the courts would be
saying that there is no reason to avoid a death if you comply with the statute.
Cyclists entering the road
Case law in Canada shows that conflicts tend to happen at the moment that
cyclists enter the road. As a universal rule, the vehicle driver already on the road has the
preference. Cyclists should wait until it is safe to enter the road. It is also important for
185
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drivers to keep looking for other vehicles, cyclists or pedestrians who may enter the road,
especially if they are children. The mere presence of children, however, does not
automatically imply liability. 188 Liability may fall upon the municipality due to a bad
design of a road.
In the Ontario case, Bartosek (Litigation guardian of) v Turret Realties Inc., a sixyear-old cyclist was held contributorily negligent, while the driver was held not liable.189
The cyclist was struck after entering the road through a ramp whose visibility from the
street was impeded due to a concrete wall. The occupier of the premises was held liable
due to the wall, while the cyclist was held contributorily negligent because he “was aware
of the danger that riding down the ramp presented.” 190 Also in Ontario, in Repic v
Hamilton (City of), three parties were held liable for a collision between a car and a
bicycle. 191 The cyclist was a 14-year-old boy who was riding on a bicycle path. The
bicycle path ended abruptly with an exit ramp that turned into a road. The cyclist was
struck right after entering the road. He was held 45% liable for failing to stop and to use
the lights. The driver was held 40% liable because he should drive carefully by expecting
someone to come from the exit ramp. The City of Hamilton was also held liable, since the
design of the bicycle path, ending abruptly on the road, contributed to the collision.
In Chiasson, a truck driver was held liable for hitting a six-year-old cyclist.192 The
cyclist was cycling on the driveway, but suddenly entered the road, and was struck by the
motor vehicle. The New Brunswick Court of the Queen's Bench considered that the
188
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driver should have driven slower due to the common presence of children in the area. The
cyclist was held 50% contributorily negligent for entering the road suddenly.
The situation of a cyclist being struck by a motor vehicle after entering the road is
one of those in which a driver may be considered not liable by case law depending on the
circumstances. Since many such cases involve children, whose behaviour is naturally
riskier, this means that the roads are deemed to be places in which many children will
inevitably die. It appears that, while, in New Brunswick, drivers need to pay attention in
areas where there usually are children playing, Ontario does not expect drivers to avoid
killing children in this situation except if the road infrastructure is unclear.
Wrong way
In an attempt to organize the flow of pedestrians on the sidewalks of Avenida Rio
Branco, in the city of Rio de Janeiro, it was decided in the 1900’s that each sidewalk
would go to a different direction.193 Pedestrians going northbound would be on one side;
on the other side would be people walking southbound. This did not work, and now
Avenida Rio Branco’s sidewalks go both ways as any other sidewalk.
Pedestrians have always decided where to walk based on convenience and
customs. In fact, the flow of pedestrians is rarely as dangerous and capable of causing
public nuisance as that of car traffic. Since the first law demanding traffic to keep to one
specific side of the road in London in 1756, the legal rule has intended to organize the
flow of carriages.194 As João Lacerda argues, “wrong way is a concept applicable to the
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flow of machines, not people.”195 Although one-way roads have existed since the Roman
era, 196 the vast majority of streets in modern cities were two-way, until some were
transformed into one-way streets in order to organize motor vehicles.197
Deemed in law as carriages, bicycles are expected to follow road conventions.
The wrong way is therefore legally applicable to them. Since it is a human-propelled
machine, however, bicycle travels tend not to fit the dynamics engineered for cars. As
much as it is far and inconvenient for a pedestrian to cross the street to go to the opposite
direction, as was intended in Avenida Rio Branco, it is frequently far and inconvenient
for a cyclist to head to another street in order to take the correct way.
In a motorized city, there is no safe option for the cyclist but to obey the rules
regarding the right way – or to dismount and go on the sidewalk as a pedestrian. Cycling
in the wrong way may indeed increase risks significantly for the cyclist. However, since
the compliance is often too inconvenient, it is a natural behaviour for people moving with
their own body’s energy to take the easiest route. This means that the traffic structure and
law encourage risky behaviour. The solution for this is already found in some
jurisdictions around the world: legalizing contraflow. Contraflow differs from the wrong
way because, being legal, cyclists are expected to move in the opposite direction. In
Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, contraflow is standardized in one-way
residential streets. 198 Contraflow makes the streets safer in three ways: it makes the
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presence of cyclists in the opposite direction predictable; it attracts cyclists to low-speed
roads in which it is implemented; and it makes the bicycle network denser.199
Bicycles allowed in the contraflow can be found in some Canadian cities, such as
Vancouver, Toronto, and Montreal.

200

Statutes generally permit governments to

implement contraflow for cyclists, although the standard norm is that bicycles have to
follow the same direction as the other vehicles. In Ontario, this permission is found on
section 153(2) of the HTA, stating that “[a] lane on a highway designated for the use of
one-way traffic only may be designated for the use of bicycle traffic in the opposite
direction.”201 Where the contraflow is not implemented, however, the courts have held the
cyclist in the wrong way liable when a collision happens.
In Morillon (Héritiers) c Godbout, the Court of Appeal of Quebec held a cyclist
contributorily negligent for both riding on the wrong side and disobeying a red light. 202
Although the cyclist was in the wrong way, the motorist who struck him was held
partially liable. That is because the cyclist’s wife had passed before him, also on a
bicycle, so the driver should be aware that another cyclist could appear after her. This is
an example of a court recognizing that a driver should not only obey the highway statute:
there is a duty to avoid collisions no matter who is wrong.
In the British Columbia Court of Appeal case Ivanoff v Bensmiller, a cyclist was
held contributorily negligent for riding on the wrong side of the road, facing oncoming
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traffic. 203 He was struck by a motor vehicle driver leaving a parking lot. It certainly
makes sense to consider the cyclist contributorily negligent in this case, since drivers will
naturally pay more attention to vehicles coming from the correct side.
An unreasonable decision on contributory negligence, however, was made by the
British Columbia Supreme Court at Kruse v John Doe.204 In this case, a cyclist was struck
by a truck driver who invaded the shoulder. The cyclist was on the left shoulder because
he intended to turn left further ahead. Due to the circumstances of the road, the court
comprehended that what the cyclist did was “more sensible” than trying to turn left from
the right side.205 The court even considered that a pedestrian would also be facing traffic,
and that it is the duty of automobile drivers not to cross the fog line.206 All this reasoning
naturally leads to the conclusion that a cyclist riding on the wrong side on a shoulder does
not contribute to a collision with a motor vehicle that invades the shoulder. If the driver
crosses the fog line, a cyclist on either way may be hit, as much as a pedestrian. The
court, however, held the cyclist contributorily negligent, by simply alleging that he was
riding on the wrong side of the road. From its words, the court shows some discomfort
with its own decision:
I think very little in favour of the defendant; that is, more fault on the
defendant (unknown) than on the plaintiff, because the plaintiff, in my
view, was not behaving in a way that was unreasonable. That is to say, he
was riding in an area that he had every reason to think was safe. He
indicated that he could not get further left because of garbage cans. I
suspect that that is somewhat reconstructed because he found the garbage
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cans, and he may well have hit the garbage cans when struck by the mirror
of the pick-up truck.207
The court did not explain how a cyclist riding on the wrong side could contribute
to a collision caused by a truck driver invading the fog line. The decision came from a
general understanding that cyclists on the wrong side are at a greater risk than on the right
side. That is a correct assumption when it comes to riding on the road. If the cyclist is on
the shoulder, it is possible that the risk is increased – for example, at intersections, where
drivers are more regardful of vehicles coming from the correct side – however the
contribution to the collision should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Failing to stop at the red light
Lacerda was quoted in the previous section saying that the wrong way is a
concept applicable for machines and not for people.208 The same idea applies to traffic
lights. Although the history of the first signal lighting for land transportation goes back to
1857, it was not until 1913 that the first mechanical traffic light appeared in the United
States, more specifically in Detroit. As seen in the first chapter, the first decades of the
20th century were marked by the emergence of the conflicts caused by the automobile,
with several deaths and injuries as a result. This emergence caused the introduction of
several measures in an attempt to organize traffic. In this new scenario of chaos, traffic
lights were found to be necessary.
Bicycles, deemed as vehicles, have to obey traffic lights. As happens with other
car-oriented measures, these are not meant to organize the flow of bicycles, yet no
solutions for them are usually put in place, causing cyclists to fall into the general rules
207
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applied to vehicles. Exceptions for that exist, however, and it is important to take a closer
look at them.
In Idaho, cyclists may treat red lights as stop signs and stop signs as yield signs.
This means that, when facing a red light, cyclists must stop, but may proceed with
caution if there is no vehicle coming to the intersection at the green light. When facing a
stop sign, cyclists do not need to stop completely, but only reduce the speed and proceed
in case it is safe to do so. This rule, known as the Idaho Stop, has existed in Idaho since
1982.209 Much later, in 2017, Delaware followed Idaho’s path, allowing cyclists to treat
stop signs as yield signs, but only in streets with 2 or fewer lanes. 210 Similar although not
identical rules exist in cities such as Paris, in France, and Breckenridge, Dillon, and
Aspen, in Colorado, United States. 211 The County of Summit, also in Colorado, has
introduced similar rules. 212 Equivalent legislation has been proposed in several other
cities, including Edmonton, Alberta.213
The experience of cycling is enough to convince anyone that the dynamics of the
bicycle are different from that of motor vehicles. While drivers only need to step on
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pedals and change gears to stop and continue, cyclists spend much physical energy to do
the same task. Research has shown what cyclists intuitively know:
For example, on a street with a stop sign every 300 feet, calculations
predict that the average speed of a 150-pound rider putting out 100 watts
of power will diminish by about forty percent. If the bicyclist wants to
maintain her average speed of 12.5 mph while still coming to a complete
stop at each sign, she has to increase her output power to almost 500 watts.
This is well beyond the ability of all but the most fit cyclists.214
Forcing cyclists to fully stop at stop signs tend to discourage cycling due to the
increased effort that it requires. This factor tends to be important since streets with many
stop signs tend to be a better alternative than the fast roads with traffic lights, which
attract more motor vehicle drivers.215
Treating cyclists differently regarding traffic lights and stop signs is not only
more comfortable, but also safer. The safety effects of the implementation of the Idaho
Stop were studied by Jason N. Meggs, who concluded that it, contrary to the predictions
of many, actually decreased the number of incidents with cyclists.216
A cyclist’s negligence, however, may occur, Idaho Stop being legal or not. In
Bradford v Snyder, a cyclist was held contributorily negligent for rolling at a stop sign
and colliding with a van.217 The motor vehicle driver was held 1/3 liable since she should
have been paying more attention at an intersection in a playground zone. In this case, the
collision would happen whether or not the Idaho Stop was implemented. The cyclist has
to be sure that it is safe to cross the intersection before a stop sign.
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Apart from Bradford v Snyder, there is a lack of case law regarding collisions
happening because a cyclist rolled through a stop sign. This is likely a result of the fact
that this approach does not result in collisions if done carefully. On the other hand,
several cases dealt with collisions happening because a motor vehicle driver rolled
through a stop sign.218
In Stalzer v Nagai, a cyclist was held 100% liable for his injuries after colliding
with a motor vehicle at an intersection.219 The cyclist was cycling on the sidewalk and
crossed along the crosswalk, ignoring the red light for pedestrians. He also had no lights
on the bicycle. Similarly, in Morillon (Héritiers) c Godbout, a cyclist was considered
contributorily negligent for both riding on the wrong side and disobeying a red light,
resulting in a collision with a motor vehicle.220 In this case, however, the motor vehicle
driver was also considered negligent because he should have foreseen that the cyclist was
going to do that, since another cyclist did the same thing before him.
Case law also shows that collisions happen right after the cyclist stops, mainly
through dynamics that would not happen if they had proceeded as indicated in the Idaho
Stop. 221 Ironically, cyclists have been held negligent in some of these cases. In
Sivasubramaniam v Franz, the cyclist was on the right shoulder and stopped at the red
light.222 When it turned green, he proceeded, but a motor vehicle driver turned right. The
cyclist was held negligent because, being in the shoulder – which is illegal in British
Columbia – he should have paid attention to cars turning right. In McKeon v Langevin,
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the cyclist stopped at the red light and was hit by a tractor trailer driver, who was on the
same lane, but proceeded to turn right at the red light. 223 The cyclist was considered
contributorily negligent for failing to see the trailer’s right signal light, which would
allow her to watch “what the truck was doing” and “lift her bike up on to the sidewalk
and step out of any area of danger.”224 This last case shows that law creates danger by
demanding cyclists to ride on the right and stop at red lights at the same time as motor
vehicles are allowed to turn right at red lights. More than that, the cyclist may even be
held contributorily negligent for failing to escape from the dangerous maneuvers of a
motorist.
Law needs to change when it comes to red lights and stop signs regarding cyclists.
The experience of Idaho shows that it is safer to allow cyclists to pass red lights and roll
through stop signs. As this section has shown, failing to do so creates not only danger to
cyclists, but also unfair liability in tort cases.

Conclusion
As paradoxical as it might sound, cycling laws were not created for bicycling.
Except for some specific cases, as in the Idaho Stop law, rules that govern cycling were
not created considering the dynamics of the bicycle. Since the law of wheelmen, bicycles
have been included in the category of carriages, which has had their rules created with
either horse-drawn vehicles or motor vehicles in mind.
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With the motorization of the roads, law also became motorized. If cyclists had to
abide by rules created for horse-drawn carriages in roads made for all, now they have to
deal with both motorized laws and roads. In this context, the designation of bicycles as
carriages is good for cyclists to be allowed on roads that are socially perceived to be for
cars. At the same time, this designation creates anomalies as many rules made for the
dynamics of the cars may be inefficient for cyclists – and even dangerous.
As shown in the first chapter, with the increased number of motorized vehicles
came the catastrophic number of road deaths. Those deaths became normalized because
of the perception that the creator of those deaths belongs on the road. Despite the
assumption that traffic laws are made to secure safety on the streets, law has followed the
social trend of normalizing cars and, as a result, normalizing deaths. As a result of
motordom’s strategy, the killings of pedestrians and cyclists may be considered a
consequence of their own failure to abide by the law, causing them to receive reduced
compensation or no compensation at all.
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CHAPTER 4
PATHS TO ROAD PEACE

In the first chapter of this thesis, it was shown that the advent of cars brought with
it the enormous problem of road death. In an effort to secure the future of their product,
motordom campaigned to stabilize the perception that cars belong on the roads. As a
result, cars became commonplace on the roads and the danger brought by them became
normalized. Bicycles, which have belonged on the roads for longer, now have to get
along with the new danger imposed on them. In the second chapter, it was shown how the
conflicting relationship between bicycles and motor vehicles have been dealt with by
Canadian courts in tort cases. Due to misconceptions regarding the dynamics of the
bicycle and the misplacement of it with rules originally made for cars, cyclists have
regularly been denied proper compensation for their losses.
As the second chapter shows, it is possible to go over each case and discuss what
each party should have done. However, even after concluding who is at fault in every
single situation in traffic, Canadian tort law fails to address the fact that road deaths as a
highly relevant social problem are a creation of modern motor vehicles. There is an
inherent danger in automobiles. Mistakes that pedestrians and cyclists committed
harmlessly before the 20th century now result in death or injury. The presence of
automobiles changed the level of safety of the streets. Motor vehicles perform their role
as dangerous obstacles that require a high level of attention from all road users, with
death and heavy injuries as punishment for any error.
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An anecdotal situation in Brazil might serve as an example in the discussion on
the creation of risk and liabilities. In Minas Gerais, Brazil, a man was angry with
neighbours who sat on the sidewalk in front of his house, chatting loudly.225 In order to
discourage them, the man installed barbed wire on the sidewalk. That action is clearly
illegal and dangerous. If a pedestrian tripped and fell on the wire, that man would
certainly be held liable for the damages. But what if law authorized that installation?
What if law, authorizing barbed wire in the sidewalk, demanded that pedestrians watch
out for barbed wire? Who, then, would be liable if a pedestrian tripped and fell on the
wire? It was not the man’s fault that the pedestrian tripped and fell. He did nothing
illegal. Nevertheless, the wire installed by the man caused much bigger harm to the
pedestrian than the sidewalk’s concrete would.
In the context of this thesis, automobiles act as the legally sanctioned barbed wire
in that automobiles are not illegal. However, when cyclists, due their own mistake, fall on
the road and are run over by a motorist, the extent of the injury is increased by the
presence for the automobile. This means that, whenever someone chooses their means of
transportation, they are selecting the amount of danger that they will impose on other
traffic users. Even when using the automobile is necessary due to the circumstances, the
very fact of using it imposes a risk to other people on the road.
A solution for addressing losses on the roads more fairly has been found long ago
in Europe. As will be shown in this chapter, Germany uses the concept of risk of the
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operation of the machine in order to impose strict liability on the keeper of the
automobile.226 An insurance system change protecting pedestrians and cyclists regardless
of who is at fault was also tried in the European Union.227 Common law imposes strict
liability when risk toward others is created, however it does not apply to motor traffic. A
closer look at the topic is needed in order to assess whether or not it should.

Strict liability vs. negligence
In contrast to the negligence regime, strict liability is referred to as “liability
without fault.”228 The definition of who pays for the damage is based on the relationship
of the parties, regardless of who was at fault. 229 In common law, the regime of strict
liability is rooted in Rylands v Fletcher, in which a landowner was held liable for the
damages caused when his reservoir flooded the plaintiff’s mine.230 The essence of the
strict liability rule was found in Lord Cranworth’s words: “For when one person, in
managing his own affairs, causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously
only just that he should be the party to suffer.”231
The question of which tort system is more adequate – strict liability or negligence
– has long been a source of academic debate.232 In fact, common law does not have a
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single principle of liability.233 Negligence has prevailed in the majority of cases since the
nineteenth century,234 becoming the most important field of tort law. 235 The system of
strict liability, however, still exists parallel to it. It is applied to some specific cases either
by force of a precedent common law case, such as in Ryland v Fletcher, or by statute,
such as the workers’ compensation laws in several jurisdictions.236
The tendency of common law towards negligence becomes apparent in Bolton v
Stone.237 In this case, during a cricket match, a ball hit by a player went above the 7-foot
fence, injuring a passerby. The House of Lords held that the owners of the field were not
negligent, even considering that the possibility of a ball being hit towards the road was
foreseeable. When this case is compared to Rylands v Fletcher, it can be seen that
common law does not have a clear definition on when to use negligence and when to use
strict liability. After all, the cricket match organizers were managing their own affairs and
injured, however innocently, another person. If Lord Cranworth’s lessons in Rylands v
Fletcher were followed, strict liability should have been applied. However, it was not.
A strong advocate for the regime of strict liability, Richard E. Epstein, explains
that the reasoning of the system is to make defendants pay for the damages caused by
their actions, since the same actions create gains for them:
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The defendant, as a purposive agent, seeks to internalize all the gains from
his action, so that it is only just and proper that he be required to bear their
costs. Even if the defendant's potential losses are unknown and
undisclosed to him, they are presumptively-remember that all we know at
this stage is that the defendant has hurt the plaintiff-equally unknown and
undisclosed to the plaintiff. Affirmative defenses, like running into the
defendant's right of way, introduce further causal complications, but they
do not alter the balance at the close of the prima facie case. To say that
simply killing another person does not create liability is, in effect, to say
that the defendant is no worse for having killed the plaintiff than if he had
not done anything at all. The "innocent" killing is treated for legal
purposes as though it were an Act of God. At this point, the supposed
moral superiority of the negligence theory becomes suspect. The line
between killing and not killing seems a lot more durable and powerful
than the line between killing and killing negligently, where the former is
not actionable even though the latter is.238
Epstein’s use of an extreme situation – that of the killing of a person – is proper
for this thesis. In the first years of the advent of the automobile, people generally blamed
drivers for road deaths. Decades later, the blame for road deaths would also be directed to
other factors, since motor vehicles were deemed to belong on the roads. Although
automobiles transformed road deaths into a relevant social problem, the dangers in
driving them is now often ignored. As a result, victims of motor vehicle drivers may end
up with no compensation at all, as in Ormiston, in which a cyclist was held to be “the sole
author of his misfortune.”239 As Epstein explains, the fact that the driver hit the cyclist is
legally treated as if they had not done anything at all.
Richard A. Posner believes that, in terms of safety, strict liability and negligence
produce the same effects. 240 However, while he singles out the economic differences
between both systems, Posner uses the automobile as an example, pointing that “[o]ne
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way to avoid an auto accident is to drive more carefully, but another is to drive less.”241
Since courts do not consider the amount of driving when they analyze the presence of
negligence, strict liability tends to be more effective for that matter. However, Posner
opposes a universal rule of strict liability, since it fails to induce victims to change their
activity level, which is another form of reducing risk.242 For the object of this thesis, that
is not a problem at all, since law does not intend to reduce the amount of cycling.
Posner also points out that “strict liability operates to insure victims of
unavoidable accidents.”243 Whether traffic fatalities are unavoidable is debatable, since
urban design and traffic policies have proven to reduce the number of road deaths
dramatically.244 However, while these conditions are not perfectly set in Canada, road
deaths and heavy injuries are certainly going to happen. Strict liability, therefore, would
serve to “insure,” in Posner words, victims of traffic violence.
Steven Shavell makes two types of divisions to analyze tort cases and decide
which system is more appropriate. First, Shavell distinguishes unilateral from bilateral
accidents. 245 In unilateral cases, the actions of the injurer affect the probability or
severity of losses, while in bilateral cases the actions of the victim must also be
considered. 246 Second, there is a distinction of accidents between strangers, accidents
between sellers and strangers, and accidents between sellers and costumers–or
241
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employers.247 Automobile-pedestrian collisions are dealt with in the category of accidents
between strangers, both as unilateral and bilateral. They may be unilateral because some
collisions are caused solely by the driver’s conduct. In bilateral cases, the victim’s
conduct also causes the collision.
It is interesting to note that Shavell does not consider cases in which only the
pedestrian caused the incident. It is not explicitly explained in the article, however the
reason may be found implicitly when the author refers to the amount of miles a driver
chooses to drive as a factor to be considered: in order for an automobile-pedestrian
collision to occur, the driver must have made the decision to drive, which in itself
represents a risk. Although this causes the impression that the author perceives the danger
of the automobile, the article proves that false when it also refers to the number of miles
walked by a pedestrian as a producer of risk.
Under a regime of negligence in unilateral cases, Shavell considers that drivers
tend to exercise due care, since that is the standard required for them not to be held
liable.248 However, since they are not liable as long as they exercise due care, drivers
“will not take into account that going more miles will mean a higher expected number of
accidents.”249 The amount of risk imposed to others will not matter, as long as the driver
follows the rules. A different situation is found if a regime of strict liability is put in
place. Drivers, knowing that they will be held liable regardless of fault, will take the risk
into account before deciding whether to drive or not.
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In bilateral cases, the contributing factor of the pedestrian’s behaviour is
considered. Under the regime of negligence, pedestrians tend to exercise due care, since
they may be held liable. 250 If the regime of strict liability is considered, however,
pedestrians will “exercise due care but will walk too many miles,” according to
Shavell.251
The topic of automobility is not central to Shavell. It is actually only referred to as
an illustration to his theory. It is natural, therefore, that deep research on the risks
imposed by each means of transportation is not made. In his example, Shavell fails to
consider that pedestrians used to walk many miles before the advent of the automobile
without considerable risk of being killed by a driver. It was in the first years of the
automobile that road fatalities started to become a relevant public concern. Walking
many miles, therefore, is not the problem. Consequently, that leaves the regime of strict
liability with no failures, at least in theory. There will be an incentive for people to drive
less, and people may walk as much as they desire. Since Shavell’s conclusion is that
“strict liability is preferable if it is more desirable to control injurer’s activity than
victims,’”252 it can be easily said that, to protect pedestrians, strict liability for motorized
vehicle drivers is preferable.
However, these considerations are solely theoretical, since common law has no
experience in adopting strict liability in road collisions. Common law has invariably
decided that traffic torts are to be resolved through negligence. It is interesting to note

250

Ibid at 7.
Ibid.
252
Ibid at 24.
251

72

that this interpretation of the law, although accepted and applied, was not always
considered fair for the victim. In Hunter v Wright (1938), Justice Goddard said:
A gentleman on his lawful occasions, on Sunday morning, on the footpath
is struck from behind, run down, and grievously injured. However,
according to the view of the judge, and in the view of this court, he cannot
recover damages. The late Swift, J., who, at the time of his lamented
death, had an unrivalled experience of these cases, said, on more than one
occasion, using the vigorous language which characterised him, that, if
Parliament allowed such potentially dangerous things as motor cars to run
on the public streets, it ought also to provide that people who were injured
by them through no fault of their own should receive compensation,
though not necessarily compensation from the driver if the driver has been
guilty of no negligence.253
For Goddard, the injury to the victim was “shocking”, however it would be
equally shocking to consider the driver as the one who caused the incident when she had
done “nothing blameworthy at all.”254 The victim ended up with no compensation at all.
The unfairness of the victim’s situation, however, was at least noted in this 1938 case.
Fast-forward to 2014, the contrast becomes evident with Justice Lowry’s decision stating
that the victim, who fell down a rocky embankment while cycling after having his life
threatened by a risky move of a motorist, was “the sole author of his misfortune” for
having done a “foolish thing.”255
Although not related to traffic issues, a practical example of the implementation
of the regime of strict liability is the workers’ compensation system in the United States,
which secured that all victims of work-related accidents would receive compensation
regardless of fault. Interestingly, there is a historical relation between industrial safety
and traffic safety in North America. Due to the new implementation of workers’
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compensation laws beginning in 1911, industries and insurance companies started
developing professional strategies to avoid industrial accidents, sparking the creation of
the National Safety Council (NSC).256 The NSC and its local affiliates soon started to
address the issue of traffic safety. However, since the negligence regime used in traffic
casualties did not create enough concern in industries to address the problem, traffic
safety campaigns were not as professional as the industrial safety ones were, and were
largely produced by citizen members of local safety councils.257
The strict liability system in the workers’ compensation laws had a positive social
impact in encouraging industries to promote and advertise safety measures. Research also
indicates that the system was successful in diminishing the number of industrial
accidents. 258 According to a comprehensive study made by James R. Chelius, “the
liability system change which occurred when the employer's traditional common law
defenses were modified or eliminated was associated with a relative decline in the nonmotor vehicle machine death.”259
Even though workers’ compensation laws are an example of strict liability
allocating the costs of accidents into the creation of the risk, it is important to assert that
the dynamics of industrial accidents are different from that of traffic collisions. In order
to understand how a strict liability system for motor occurrences in traffic would work, it
is necessary to look at jurisdictions in which it has been applied.
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Strict liability for car drivers or owners in France and Germany
Several jurisdictions in Europe impose some form of strict liability to car drivers
or owners in contrast to the regular negligence system used in Canada. 260 Since they
differ from one another, an analysis of some countries’ approach to the topic will be
important to inform the best solution for Ontario.
France
Before 1985, tort law on road incidents in France were regulated by the general
tort provisions in articles 1382 et seq. at the time, now in articles 1240 et seq.261 While
articles 1382 and 1383 clearly state the element of fault, article 1384 does not.
Art. 1382
Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges
the one by whose fault it occurred, to compensate it.
Art. 1383
Everyone is liable for the damage he causes not only by his
intentional act, but also by his negligent conduct or by his imprudence.
Art. 1384
A person is liable not only for the damages he causes by his own act, but
also for that which is caused by the acts of persons for whom he is
responsible, or by things which are in his custody.262

Due to the apparent contradiction of article 1384, which does not require the
element of fault, to the previous articles 1382 and 1383, which do require this element,
the prevalent interpretation was that article 1384 was an introduction to its own
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paragraphs and to its following articles, 263 which do not require the element of fault.
With the high number of industrial accidents following the industrial revolution, French
courts broadened the scope of article 1384, applying it in cases of employees being
harmed by industrial machinery.264 The courts, therefore, denied that the phrase “things
which are in his custody” referred only to animals and buildings. The courts’
interpretation, however, presumed the existence of fault.265 Because of that, employers
could defend themselves by proving that they were not negligent.266 In response to this
interpretation, French lawmakers passed a workers’ compensation act, according to
which fault was not a necessary element for employees to gain compensation for
industrial accident losses.267
During the 20th century, the courts’ interpretation on article 1384 evolved towards
determining compensation without proof of fault:268 defendants should be held liable for
damages caused by things in their custody with no chance of providing the absence of
negligence as a defence. The debate now was whether article 1384 was also applied in
cases in which the object was mishandled or only in cases of defective objects.269 If the
latter is true, damages caused by the mishandling of objects would fall into article 1382,
which demands proof of fault. This debate was extremely important for cases of
automobile incidents. Suggesting that article 1384 only applies in cases of defective
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objects would mean that pedestrians and cyclists hit by motorists would need to provide
evidence of negligence, unless the incident was caused by a defect in the vehicle.
The matter was decided in the Jand’heur case, with the Cour de Cassation holding
that the absence of negligence could not be used as a defence against liability based on
article 1384. 270 According to the decision, a motor vehicle is inherently dangerous,
requiring special attention from its owner.271 However, two following decisions would
make the matter more confusing. In Desmares, two pedestrians were hit by a car while
they were crossing a road.272 The courts could not determine whether they were on the
crosswalk. Nonetheless, the second civil chamber of the Cour the Cassation held the
driver fully liable, considering that contributory negligence was not a possible defence
under article 1384.273 In contrast to this decision, in Derguini v Tidu, a five-year-old girl
was held contributorily negligent when she was hit and killed while crossing a road on a
crosswalk.274 Her contributory negligence came from the fact that she ran, panicked by
the approach of a vehicle, which made it impossible for the motor vehicle driver to avoid
the collision. The difference from Desmares was that, in Derguini, the case was brought
as an adjunct of a criminal proceeding for the crime of manslaughter.275 In this situation,
the case had to be decided under article 1382, therefore based on fault and allowing the
defence of contributory negligence.276
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It was in this scenario of confusion that loi du 5 juillet 1985 (loi Badinter) was
enacted, having passed unanimously through the French Parliament. 277 The new law
considers the driver or keeper of a motorized vehicle strictly liable for losses derived
from road incidents.278 The main objective of the law is that every road violence victim
receives compensation for their losses.279 For that reason, there is no defence for natural
events or acts of a third party.280
The strict liability system does not apply when the victim is the driver, as a result
of a demand from the insurance industry, which claimed that premiums would increase
significantly otherwise.281 With this exception, the law cannot fulfill its goal of assuring
compensation for every road victim. Another factor that takes the law further away from
this objective is the possibility of denying the victim any compensation if it was proven
that the incident occurred exclusively due to the victim’s “inexcusable fault,” making
possible the defence of contributory negligence.282 This was another compromise in order
to make it possible for the law to pass through Parliament. 283 There are, however,
limitations for this exception. If the victim is less than 16 years old, more than 70 years
old or at least 80% incapacitated, only intentional contributions may be alleged as
contributory negligence. 284 Also, there is no partial compensation: if the fault of the
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victim is found not to be the exclusive cause for the incident, the victim will receive full
compensation.285
This innovation did not pass smoothly through the courts. At first, judges
interpreted the scope of the term “inexcusable fault” broadly in order to apply
contributory negligence. The simple act of stepping inadvertently off the sidewalk, for
example, was considered an inexcusable fault. 286 However, when the cases got to the
Cour de Cassation, the definition of “inexcusable fault” was considerably narrowed,
resulting in the reform of 10 out of 11 cases in one afternoon.287 Following the Cour de
Cassation’s interpretation, inexcusable fault only happens in case of "a voluntarily fault
of an exceptional seriousness which exposes without any reason the person who commits
it to a danger of which he ought to have been aware."288
The law also broadens the possibility of the victim receiving compensation by
considering liable every driver or owner whose vehicle is “involved” in the incident. 289 If
there’s an incident with many vehicles involved, victims may claim damages from any of
the vehicles’ drivers or owners, no matter which car actually hit each victim specifically.
The results of the law are deemed positive. Andre Tunc, a strong advocate of the
system, said in 1996 that “no one, today, advocates for the repeal of the loi Badinter.”290
The behaviour of road users was not worsened by the law. 291 Insurance premiums
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increased at a lesser rate than the cost of living.292 The delay to receive compensation was
reduced.293 Cases going to courts dropped from 27% to 10%,294 particularly since fault of
either the victim or the driver were not an issue in 90% of traffic incidents.295 The French
liability approach to road violence remains an inspiration for other jurisdictions.
Germany
German tort law is generally based on fault, a tradition that dates back to precodification times.296 It was in the second half of the nineteenth century that risk liability
(Gefährdungshaftung) was introduced to German law through specific statutes. Despite
those statutes, the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches GesetzBuch, BGB), passed in 1896,
has based German tort law strongly on fault, leaving strict liability to be regulated by
statutes. 297 In contrast to some other legal systems, strict liability in Germany has a
tradition to be applied solely by the legislature.298 For this reason, German judges never
had the chance to apply the French interpretation regarding cases of road violence that
existed even before the enactment of the loi Badinter.
Strict liability rules developed alongside German industries.299 New technologies
brought new and increased dangers that needed to be addressed. Industrial activities were
encouraged, however it was understood that these activities should be “saddled with the
cost of the risks they entailed.”300 Following this mindset, a resolution was passed at a
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conference of lawyers demanding the Imperial Insurance Act be expanded to motorized
vehicles. 301 The debate entered Parliament, which enacted the Motor Vehicle Act in
1909, not including, however, any insurance system.302 This Act became the Road Traffic
Act in 1952. It is interesting to note that the conference that originated the debate
happened in 1902, when the number of cars in Germany were incomparably lower than
today.303 This means that the number of road deaths were still to increase considerably in
the following years.304 At the same time, however, it means that road deaths were not as
accepted as they became after the stabilization of the notion that cars belong to the road.
According to the German Road Traffic Act, the registered keeper (Halter) of an
automobile is strictly liable for personal injury, death, and property damages caused to
others due the operation of the vehicle.305 The keeper is the person who has control over
the use of the vehicle, who may not necessarily be the owner.306
As the law was created in response to the increase in road violence which
followed the advent of the fast and heavy automobile, the Road Traffic Act’s strict
liability regime does not apply for vehicles that travel at less than 20km/h.307 Basil S.
Markesinis opposes this limitation, arguing that, “given the evidence that we now have
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that most lethal traffic accidents occur at speeds of under 30mph, this provision of the
statute seems of dubious validity.”308 More thought should be given to this opinion. First
of all, Markesinis does not cite the source of this information. Second, 30mph is much
faster than 20hm/h, making the alleged data of incidents occurring under 30mph
insufficient to evaluate this norm. Third, even at low speeds, motor vehicles that have the
power to travel at faster speeds tend to create more risks due to acceleration power. A
person running at 12km/h takes longer to get to that speed, while a car gets there quickly,
enhancing its unpredictability. This means that a vehicle that has the power to run faster
can be more dangerous, even in lower speeds. These nuances have to be kept in mind in
order for the elements that make automobiles dangerous to be understood.309
The German legislator decided to leave pain and suffering out of the scope of the
Road Traffic Act. 310 These sorts of damages, however, can be recovered through the
general fault rule of the German Civil Code. Another limitation imposed to the strict
liability regime is the maximum compensation amount. The plaintiffs cannot recover
more than five million euros through the Road Traffic Act.311 If the event happened due
to the use of highly or fully automated vehicle, this maximum compensation is increased
to ten million euros.312 Defendants can allege force majeure as a defence.313 Contributory
negligence is another possible defence, which makes it possible for the compensation to
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be reduced.314 Even though the German strict liability system protects the victim better
than the common law negligence system used in Canada, the fact that the legislator left
pain and suffering and values that exceed the maximum compensation amount out of the
scope of the Road Traffic Act suggest an unreasonable fear of creating excessive burden
to vehicle owners and insurance companies. In Markesinis’ view:
If these “limitations” imposed by the statutes were dictated by fears of
unlimited liability and unbearable economic consequences, especially at a
time when insurance was not as widely spread as it is today, then the time
has surely come to reconsider the validity of this kind of argument.
Certainly, the absence of any maxima in compensation paid under the
Water Act has caused no problems. In motor vehicle insurance, coverage
in excess of the maximum amount provided by the statute (i.e. DM
750,000) is widely obtained without a considerable increase in premium
cost. Finally, the Swiss experience, quite different in this respect from the
German, has not justified the fears expresses in Germany concerning an
extension of the rules of strict liability.315
The fact that the German system is criticized for not fully protecting victims of
road violence speaks even louder about the negligence system used in Canada. Germany
and France have been mostly successful in protecting victims with the strict liability
system, with no negative consequences for the sustainability of insurance companies.

Insurance systems
It is impossible to talk about compensation systems for road violence damages
without mentioning insurance systems. Both in France and in Germany, insurance law
plays an important role to assure that the victims are compensated for their losses.
Quebec’s insurance law also does an important job protecting victims of road violence by
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assuring compensation for everyone regardless of fault. In Ontario, victims who are not
protected by tort law are also not protected by insurance law. In other words, if a victim
is held fully liable for their losses, the car owner’s insurance contract does not obligate
the insurance company to compensate the victim.
Naturally, if the victim has their own insurance, they will be compensated under
that. Although insurance for pedestrians and cyclists is rare, people who contract
insurance as drivers are entitled to claim damages against their insurance companies if
they are struck by a motor vehicle while walking or cycling. This is a consequence of
section 5.2.1 of the Ontario Automobile Policy, a document that contains the standard
automobile insurance conditions in the province, which states:
We will pay any amounts you or other insured persons have a legal right
to recover as damages from the owner or driver of an uninsured or
unidentified automobile for bodily injury resulting from an accident
involving an automobile, up to the limits in this Section.316
Ontario and Quebec’s “no-fault” insurance systems are important for this thesis,
since they work similarly to a strict liability system in the sense that the victim is
compensated without any debate regarding fault. Posner refers to this type of system as
“no liability,” since it does not involve tort. 317 In Ontario, however, damages to third
parties, although covered by automobile insurances, are not included in the no-fault
system. As a consequence, drivers receive automatic compensation if they are hurt, but
pedestrians and cyclists hit by a motorist have to rely on the tort system.
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Insurance for third-part liability in France
Apart from the loi Badinter’s tort regulation, French legislation also relies on
third party insurance, public compensation fund and social security to protect victims of
road violence. Third party insurance is regulated by the French insurance code, which
requires anyone who may be liable for damages in which a motor vehicle is involved to
contract insurance.318
The third party insurance required by law covers damages caused by anyone who
uses the vehicle, even if they were not authorized, except if the driver is a professional
involved in repairing, selling and inspecting.319 If the use of the car was not authorized,
the insurance company is entitled to receive compensation against the person liable for
the damages paid to the insured person.320 Damages to passengers of the vehicle are also
covered by the mandatory insurance. 321 If the vehicle is stolen, perpetrators, coperpetrators and accomplices are not covered.

322

The third party must claim

compensation against the insurance company, instead of the driver or the owner of the
vehicle.323 If there is no dispute regarding liability and amount of damages, the insurer
must offer compensation within three months from the incident. 324 If there is a dispute, it
must present a response within this same period.325 In case of physical injury, an offer of
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of 191,132 traffic incidents, while in 2010 there were 8206 claims out of 67,288 traffic
incidents.327
The insurance contract cannot limit the amount of damages related to personal
injury to be insured.328 This limitation is possible in case of property damages, however it
cannot be set at an amount inferior to that which is decided by the government as the
minimum.329 Two other possibilities of limitation are the case of the motorist not having
a driver’s licence and the case of people being carried in the automobile without
following safety requirements.330 In these situations, however, the victim can still claim
for damages against the insurance company, which in turn has a right of recourse against
the person insured.331
Although the French insurance regime is fairly broad in its scope to protect the
victim of road violence, there are still cases in which the victim may be found
unprotected by insurance law. The person liable for the incident might be unknown or
uninsured, or the insurance company may be insolvent. In these cases, there is a
guarantee fund of compulsory damage insurances (fonds de garantie des assurances
obligatoires de dommage), against which the victim may claim compensation.332
The French insurance rules for third party liability might not differ much from
their equivalent in other jurisdictions. In Ontario, for example, insurance for third party
liability is also mandatory. However, it is its combination with the strict liability regime

327

Borghetti, supra note 236 at 288–289.
Ibid at 284.
329
Ibid.
330
Art R 211-10 Insurance Code (France).
331
Borghetti, supra note 236 at 284.
332
Art L 241-1 Insurance Code (France).
328

86

that makes sure all victims of road violence are compensated for their losses. Tort law
assures that victims do not need to discuss fault to receive compensation, and insurance
law assures that the financial amount they are entitled to effectively exists and is received
within a reasonable time.
Insurance for third-part liability in Germany
In Germany, third party liability insurance became mandatory in 1939, through
the Obligatory Insurance Act.333 In 1965, the Act, known as Pflichtversicherungsgesetz,
was reformed in order to comply with the European Convention on Compulsory
Insurance against Civil Liability in Respect of Motor Vehicles. 334 The new law was
intended to broaden the scope of protection to road violence victims in situations of
uninsured vehicles and hit-and-run cases.335 In 1968, the Aid for Traffic Victims Fund
(Verkehrsopferhilfe) was created in order to protect victims when the insurer is insolvent.
According to German law, a keeper of an automobile must carry insurance for
himself and for the driver of the vehicle.336 The minimum coverage has to include the
maximum amount of damages that the keeper or the driver may be strictly liable for
according to the Road Traffic Act.337 In Germany, a valid certificate of insurance is a
requirement for obtaining a licence to operate a motor vehicle. 338 It is a criminal offence
to drive an automobile without abiding to this obligation.339
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The victim has a direct right of action against the insurer.340 The insurance policy
protects the victim until after its cancellation, however the claim must be put in place
within one month after the cancellation is notified to the licensing authority. 341 The
insurer is also liable if the driver is a person not authorized to use the vehicle by its
keeper. 342 While in this situation the keeper is not liable, nevertheless insurance law
obliges the insurance company to compensate for damages in order to secure the
protection of the victim. This last rule was not in the original Obligatory Insurance Act,
but was added in the 1969 reform.343
As it can be seen, the German insurance system is relatively similar to its French
counterpart, seeking to avoid leaving road violence victims unprotected. The minimum
insured amount for personal damages is not unlimited in German law, however it works
within the logic of the system of the Road Traffic Act, which delimits a maximum
amount of damages to be compensated under this act.
In fact, in order for the German law to secure protection for road violence victims,
both tort law and insurance law must work in tune. While tort law frees the victim from
the discussion over fault, the scope of the German insurance system, as Markesinis puts
it, “is to protect the injured but at the same time to spread the risk of this immensely
useful but also highly dangerous activity to the whole community of those carrying the
activity.”344
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No-fault first-party insurance in Ontario
Ontario’s Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act obliges owners and lessees of a
motor vehicle to contract automobile insurance.345 Third-party liability is included in this
obligation, at a minimum amount of $200,000.346 However, it is interesting to study, for
the purposes of this thesis, the provincial no-fault liability system for first-party damages
arising from automobile incidents. The no-fault scheme resembles a strict liability system
as it eliminates discussion over fault; nonetheless, it is considered to be a no-liability
system, since the whole system is regulated by insurance law, with no discussion over
tort law at all.347
The first no-fault scheme for automobile insurance in the English-speaking world
was introduced in Saskatchewan in 1946. 348 The system spread throughout Canada in
different manners. In Saskatchewan, it is possible to choose between a no-fault coverage
or compensation through the tort system with less no-fault benefits. 349 Manitoba and
Quebec are considered to have a “pure” no-fault system, because there is no civil right of
action for damages.350 In Ontario, its first form was created in 1969.351 It was offered on
a voluntary basis, coexisting, therefore, with the option for the traditional tort system.352
In 1972, medical and rehabilitation expenses were introduced to the system, 353 which
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became mandatory in all automobile insurance policies in 1974.354 However, the right to
sue in tort still existed for amounts not covered by the no-fault scheme.355 Moreover, the
fact that the no-fault system was a mandatory component of insurance policies did not
mean that insurance was mandatory in order to maintain a motor vehicle. Automobile
insurance became mandatory in 1980.356
In the mid-80s, debates over an alleged “insurance crisis” arose, with concerns
regarding the rise of insurance premiums.357 James M. Flaherty and Catherine H. Zingg
tell of an outcry coming from the insurance world over the so-called “Brampton case,”358
in which trial damages were held at more than $6 million.359 The case was referred to in
debates regarding automobile insurance, although it consisted of a city liability case in
which two cyclists collided with each other. 360 Nonetheless, the case highlighted the
defence of a stricter no-fault liability scheme, limiting the scope of unforeseeable tort
litigations. As a result, changes in the scheme limited tort law through the creation of a
restrictive threshold system in 1990, with the support of the insurance industry-sponsored
Insurance Bureau of Canada. 361 Tort law was relegated solely to cases of “permanent
serious disfigurement” and “permanent serious impairment of an important bodily
function caused by a continuing injury which is physical in nature.” 362 After 1990,
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several reforms took place in order to improve coverage, reduce assessment costs, reduce
costs of first-party benefits, and reduce abusive and fraudulent claims.363
The current system protects “the owner of an automobile, the occupants of an
automobile and any person present at the incident” from liability “arising directly or
indirectly from the use or operation of the automobile.” 364 Instead of the tort system,
damages are recovered through benefits as provided by the Statutory Accident Benefits
Schedule,365 which establishes the benefit amount for different situations. If the insured
“sustains an impairment that is predominantly a minor injury”, the medical and
rehabilitation benefits must not exceed $3,500.

366

In the case of “catastrophic

impairment”, the limit is $1 million.367 In other cases, it is $65,000.368 The statute also
provides amounts regarding income loss and loss of income capacity, which also vary
depending on the situation.369 As an exception, damages regarding health care can be
claimed through tort in cases of “permanent serious disfigurement” and “permanent
serious impairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function.”370
The Ontario automobile insurance system has been highly criticized for its
complexity. Stephen E. Firestone says that “the area has become highly complex and
confusing to all but the most expert in the area.” 371 Mary Kelly, Anne Kleffner and
Sharon Tennyson argue that the several reforms since 1990 have failed to stabilize the
363
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cost of insurance, especially in the Greater Toronto Area. 372 Specialists have also
highlighted, in non-academic publications, the constant rise in premium costs and number
of claims. 373 Kenneth D. Cooper-Stephenson alleges that proving that injuries were
caused by circumstances that fit within the no-fault system may be difficult.374 None of
the critics, however, demand a return to the tort system.
For the purposes of this thesis, the most important deficiency in the no-fault
system is that it does not cover third-party damages. Pedestrians and cyclists, who are
threatened by the danger of automobiles on the roads, are less protected by law than those
who benefit from motor vehicles. This lack of protection seems to make sense at first
glance, from a customer-provider perspective; after all, pedestrians and cyclists generally
do not pay for insurance. Nonetheless, law leaves us with a system that provides less
protection specifically to the victims of road violence that do not cause road violence.
Naturally, the Ontario Hospital Insurance Plan, which is the provincial public
health insurance system, has the capacity of absorbing those victims. However, this
means that the costs of road violence are transferred to all taxpayers, instead of allocating
those costs to motor vehicle drivers. 375 Even in New Zealand, which has a very
comprehensive insurance system covering all sorts of accidents (not only road cases),376
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road violence victims’ compensation is provided by the Motor Vehicle Compensation
Fund.377 This Fund is financed by taxes on driver’s licences and motor vehicles.378
Naturally, the reduced protection of road violence victims in Ontario’s insurance
system is a result of its combination with tort law. Based on negligence, tort law fails to
provide compensation to victims of road violence in several cases. For those, insurance
law does not come to the rescue. There is, however, insurance in case negligence is
proven or presumed. If tort law established a strict liability system, victims would be
automatically protected by the insurance system as it is now – until the limits of
protection of $200,000 (minimum), which is ridiculously low compared to the equivalent
in Germany (five million euros) or in France, which prohibits any limitation to the third
party’s amount of compensation.
Ontario, therefore, has two options to enhance the protection of victims of road
violence. The first is to copy the French and German systems, establishing strict liability
in case of damages to pedestrians and cyclists caused by the use of a motor vehicle, in
addition to an insurance system that secures the compensation amount, which Ontario
already has, although it is limited. The second option is to establish a no-fault insurance
system for damages caused to third parties, when those third parties do not have
insurance of their own. This would be an extension of the current no-fault system.
The third-party no-fault insurance attempt in Europe
An attempt to secure full protection to victims of road violence through insurance
law was made in Europe. A proposal of a Fifth Motor Directive was made by the
377
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European Commission, including mandatory insurance for damages caused to pedestrians
and cyclists with no need to discuss fault. The original proposal intended to add the
following article: “The insurance referred to in Article 3(1) of Directive 72/166/EEC
shall cover personal injuries suffered by pedestrians and cyclists as a consequence of an
accident in which a motor vehicle is involved, irrespective whether the driver is at
fault.”379
In England, used to the common law negligence system which, as in Canada,
leaves some victims without compensation, the proposal was received with a great deal of
anti-cyclist paranoia. The Guardian alerted that “[t]o the delight of cyclists and the
dismay of drivers, a European law is being planned to force motorists to pay
compensation and damages in all accidents with cyclists.”380 Another column in the same
newspaper said that
The apparent disregard of so-called "guerrilla cyclists" for traffic signals
and the highway code has long irritated Britain's drivers and a
controversial proposal on motor insurance from the European commission
is about to spark a new bout of collective road rage.381
A BBC column`s subtitle added that “[b]lameless drivers may be forced to
compensate careless cyclists and pedestrians in road accidents, under new EU plans to
shake up the UK's insurance market.” 382 The press, of course, was not alone in their
criticism, with the Comité Européen des Assurances and the European Bureau of the
379
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International Alliance of Tourism and International Automobile Federation expressing
“concern” over the proposed norm.383
The European Commission responded with a press release, stating that most
traffic incidents are caused by motor vehicles and that the cost of insurance would not be
affected.384 It concluded the topic by saying:
The proposal adopted by the Commission in this regard aims to ensure that
pedestrians and cyclists are covered by the compulsory insurance of the
vehicle involved in the accident. This enhances their protection, as the
weakest parties in traffic. This insurance coverage does not prejudge the
civil liability which the pedestrian or cyclist may incur, or the level of
compensation which is determined by the Member States' national
legislation.385
The European Commission was caught in a difficult situation on this topic, since
civil liability is not part of its competence. For this reason, it made clear, or at least tried
to, that the liability system of the member states would remain intact. It failed to explain,
however, how a no-fault insurance system would harmonize jurisdictions that rely on
negligence in tort law. In the situation of a cyclist being held fully liable for an incident,
tort law would conclude that the cyclist should receive no compensation, while insurance
law would demand the insurer to compensate the victim. If the cyclist receives the
money, it means that tort law is useless in these cases. If the money has to be returned to
the insurance company, the no-fault insurance rule has no point in existing.
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This debate will, at least for now, remain solely in theory, since the idea did not
go forward. The proposed Fifth Motor Directive came into force without that norm.
Afterwards, the whole Directive was repealed by a new Directive, which did not contain
the no-fault rule to protect cyclists and pedestrians.
Ontario, however, does not need to go through such logical struggle to implement
a similar no-fault system. Since Parliament has the jurisdiction over both insurance and
tort matters, a new law could be enacted establishing the no-fault insurance rule and
abolishing tort litigation over the issue, as was done in Quebec.
No-fault insurance system in Quebec
The Quebec automobile insurance system is deemed to be one of the most
ambitious and successful no-fault systems. 386 The system came to existence with the
Automobile Insurance Act in 1978,387 with the intent to secure compensation for victims
of road violence.388 Victim, for the purpose of the system, is a person who suffers bodily
injury.389 Damages to property are left out of the no-fault rule, having to rely on the faultbased tort system prescribed in articles 108 to 121.390
Contrary to the solely first-party no-fault system in Ontario, the Quebec no-fault
system applies to third parties as well. 391 Tort claims based on fault is completely
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abandoned for bodily injury caused by an automobile.392 Victims receive compensation
from the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec regardless of who was at fault.393
In order to be entitled to receive the compensation, however, the victim must be resident
in Quebec.394 Non-residents may also be entitled to it, as long as they are not responsible
for the incident, which is decided following ordinary rules of law. 395 Interestingly,
residents of Quebec can also receive compensation even if the incident occurs outside of
Quebec.396
The compensation that victims are entitled to are broad, including medical and
paramedical care, transportation and lodging, prostheses and orthopedic devices and
cleaning, repair and replacement of clothing damaged in the incident. 397 Personal home
assistance may be provided through reimbursements that may not exceed $614 per
week.398 Income replacement is also provided for victims who holds an employment on a
full-time basis at the time of the incident.399 Those who are unemployed may also receive
income replacement indemnity for 180 days following the incident if they become unable
to hold an employment that they could not have due to the incident. 400 For pain and
suffering, indemnity in the maximum of $175,000 may be provided. 401 Indemnities to
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dependents are also provided by the Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec,
consisting of a death benefit plus up to 15 hours of psychological treatment.402
The Quebec system is considered to be a collectivisation of road risks. 403 Its
income is composed 75% from annual contribution of owners of registered vehicles, 15%
from the attainment of driver’s licences and 10% from interests and taxes over
gasoline.404 It is, therefore, paid by drivers, which consist of the road user category that
promote road risks. The Automobile Insurance Act does not forget the costs of road
violence imposed on the public health services. It determines that the Société de
l’assurance automobile du Québec pays into the Consolidated Revenue Fund the total
cost of health services required as a result of automobile incidents.405
The success of the Quebec system is such that it is suggested to be implemented
in France,406 whose strict liability system is also deemed to have culminated in positive
results. 407 Lawyers, however, have criticized the system, considering unfair that all
victims, including criminals, receive the same treatment.408 Negative consequences have
also been reported, stating that “road accidents and victims” have increased after the law,
although at an amount not “significant in a statistical sense.”409 Marc Gaudry believes
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this increase was due to factors unrelated to the no-fault characteristic of the system.410
Indeed, it is possible that drivers tend to be less concerned about driving carefully, since
their behaviour on the road do not correspond to liability for damages that they might
inflict. According to Marcel Boyer and Georges Dionne, the increase on road casualties
could be avoided or reduced with an “adequate pricing scheme,” together with proper
penalties for traffic violations.411
Despite its imperfections, it is hard to deny that the Quebec system is better than
the Ontario system when it comes to third-party bodily injury compensation. Pedestrians
and cyclists are better served with tools to quickly receive compensation for automobilerelated damages in Quebec. In Ontario, the insurance system aims solely to protect the
driver against liability that may arise due to negligent driving. It was never intended to
protect pedestrians and cyclists, who are left with the traditional tort system to seek
compensation for their losses. Ontario, however, also has the option of adopting strict
liability for third-party damages in its tort system, which would be automatically covered
in the current insurance system. The lack of interest in driving carefully, which may be a
factor in the Quebec regime, would be overcome by the risk of an increase in the
insurance premium of a driver who is involved in a traffic incident.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

Road violence is not always seen as road violence. The words used to describe the
bloodshed in our public spaces tends to make it seem less outraging. “Accident” has
become the standard term used to refer to traffic occurrences, regardless of the fact that a
series of decisions had to be made in order for them to happen. Reports have been written
as if cars, buses, and trucks went around the city by themselves hitting people, with
headlines such as “truck kills a cyclist.”412
If somebody from the nineteenth century was suddenly transported to current
times, they would probably feel surprised and scared by the current picture of road
violence. The simple act of moving around the city has become a dangerous activity.
People talk about helmets for cycling to work, as if the need of head protection against
violence in the city was completely natural.
This surprise over road violence, however, would be mitigated if the same person
lived throughout the twentieth century until today. They would see the advent of the car
and all the promises that it made to the future of cities. They would get involved in the
atmosphere of prosperity that the car promoted through intense advertising
bombardments. The idea that the car belongs on the road brought with it the idea that the
violence attached to it also does. The logic goes: if it is true that the road has dangerous
cars, then pedestrians have to be careful as they cross. Then cyclists have to wear
helmets. If the pedestrian or the cyclist does not comply with the new standard of care
412
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designated to them, all the consequences, as severe as they may be, are due to their own
fault.
Law, as a product of its time, followed the same path. In the beginning, some
reluctance was shown to leaving victims were with no compensation at all. It would take
years until the courts, as society did, internalized the idea that pedestrians and cyclists as
victims of road violence are to be left empty-handed if the driver was not negligent. After
it was internalized, though, decisions on the topic became a mere technical matter, with
all reluctance gone. Sometimes, as in British Columbia, the wording in decisions suggest
that the adjudicator feels a sense of justice in leaving the victim unprotected, as if small
mistakes should have consequences as severe as having a car thrown at one’s body.413
Fortunately, the same history was not followed in all parts of the world. In France
and Germany, the revulsion against road violence was quickly transformed into law,
which gave the keeper of a motor vehicle the responsibility of ensuring that the existence
of that property will not cause damages to anyone. In a different manner, Quebec
managed to relocate the costs of automobile damage to the drivers. In these jurisdictions,
the most important factor, instead of a moral debate over the conduct of the driver, is to
secure the protection of the victim.
In the common law world, voices of those concerned with the victims did exist,
but were not heard. In 1982, Lord Denning wrote:
In the present state of motor traffic, I am persuaded that any civilized
system of law should require, as a matter of principle, that the person who
uses this dangerous instrument on the roads dealing death and destruction
all around - should be liable to make compensation to anyone who is
413
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killed or injured in consequence of the use of it. There should be liability
without proof of fault. To require an injured person to prove fault results
in the gravest injustice to many innocent persons who have not the
wherewithal to prove it.414
There is still time to change the system in order to better protect the victims of
road violence in Ontario. The province already has both a no-fault insurance system,
which does not cover damages caused to a third party, and a mandatory third-party
insurance system. It only needs to choose between establishing strict liability for damage
caused by road violence, which would be automatically covered by the third-party
insurance that already exists, and broadening the scope of the no-fault insurance system,
in order to secure compensation for damages caused to third parties, with no discussion
over fault whatsoever. Both of these measures can be taken by the legislature. However,
it is never too late for the courts to re-examine their approach to road violence tort cases
and adopt a strict liability regime similar to France’s and Germany’s, recognizing the act
of driving as a producer of risks.
A fairer tort system is likely to affect new technologies. A driver tends to be more
personally interested in automobiles that automatically avoid collisions with pedestrians
and cyclists if they know they will be held liable regardless of fault. Autonomous
vehicles are also affected, since strict liability would increase the costumers’ interest in
purchasing the safest vehicle as possible. Indeed, autonomous vehicles open a new page
of tort law discussions. Their novelty creates a sense of danger which results in measures
such as the one in Germany, which increased the strict liability compensation amount for
damages caused by autonomous vehicles.
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accommodate autonomous vehicles, it is important to address how autonomous vehicles
should affect our understanding of tort law for regular vehicles. If it is true that
autonomous vehicles should be treated by tort law as something capable of causing
injuries and death, regular vehicles should be treated the same way. It seems that the
perception of the danger caused by autonomous vehicles is now somewhat similar to the
perception of the danger of regular motorized vehicles in the beginning of the twentieth
century, when every death was received with popular anger. Perhaps the advent of this
new technology will help us bring back the perception that the use of motor vehicles,
autonomous or not, create unjust risks to other people. Different perceptions over
autonomous vehicles may be categorized into new technological frames, as happened
with regular automobiles, allowing the comparison of how the danger of both –
autonomous and non-autonomous vehicles – was perceived in their advent.
More study on tort law regarding road violence is also necessary in the area of
liability of public authorities. Municipalities have been held liable for defects on road
design that cause collisions. 416 However, there is a lack of discussion on the broad
responsibility of municipalities for road violence by incentivising motor vehicle use
through city planning. Apart from tort law, planning law and criminal law should also be
addressed under the perspective of cycling law. The findings of this thesis may also be
included in road safety policies such as Vision Zero. Although Vision Zero intends to
eventually eliminate all road deaths and heavy injuries,417 it is important to ensure that,
while this goal is not achieved, all road violence victims are compensated for their losses.
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